{"id":505,"date":"2026-04-13T16:14:22","date_gmt":"2026-04-13T20:14:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/?p=505"},"modified":"2026-04-13T16:16:49","modified_gmt":"2026-04-13T20:16:49","slug":"before-the-wave-gaps-in-tsunami-preparedness","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/2026\/before-the-wave-gaps-in-tsunami-preparedness\/","title":{"rendered":"Before the Wave: Gaps in Tsunami Preparedness"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Before the Wave: Gaps in Tsunami Preparedness \n <\/h1>\n \n \n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n
\"Tsunami<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In my previous blog post<\/a>, I explored how disaster risk reduction strategies such as early warning systems, tsunami awareness, and education and outreach activities have helped reduce fatalities during tsunami events. However, the case studies reviewed during my summer 2025 research with the Disaster Lab show that, much like a sieve or colander, these protective measures may not always perform effectively.\u00a0This post turns to the gaps that remain, examining how limitations in detection technologies and urban infrastructure can delay evacuation and increase risk before a tsunami arrives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Limitations of Early Warning Systems<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

While early warning systems are an essential component of tsunami risk reduction, the literature shows that these systems are not effective across all tsunami types. Most tsunami detection technologies are primarily designed to identify tsunamis generated by large submarine earthquakes, rather than those caused by volcanic eruptions or submarine landslides. As a result, non-seismic induced tsunamis (notably those caused by volcanic eruptions or submarine and aerial landslides) are often detected later, increasing the likelihood of delayed evacuation and higher fatality risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This limitation was evident during the 2018 Sunda Strait tsunami in Indonesia. The tsunami was generated by a volcanic flank collapse rather than an earthquake, meaning residents received little to no advance warning [1]. Existing ocean buoys are designed to detect tsunamis caused by earthquakes exceeding approximately magnitude 6.5 with shallow hypocentres, conditions that were not present during this event [2]. Additionally, buoy-based systems typically require several minutes to register abnormal sea level changes, which is insufficient for landslide induced tsunamis that can reach shorelines within minutes of generation [1].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similar detection challenges were observed following the Hunga Tonga\u2013Hunga Ha\u02bbapai volcanic eruption. In Aotearoa New Zealand, tsunami advisories were issued only about one hour prior to wave arrival, as monitoring systems began detecting tsunami signals several hours after the eruption [3]. Although this provided some time for response, the delay highlights how existing early warning infrastructure is less effective for volcanic tsunamis than for earthquake generated events.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Urban Planning and Evacuation Challenges<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Hurricane<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Beyond detection and warning systems, tsunami risk is also shaped by the physical layout of cities and towns. Urban features that slow evacuation, including road congestion and limited transport capacity, are strongly associated with higher fatality risk during tsunami events [4].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Across multiple case studies, traffic congestion has emerged as a major challenge during tsunami evacuations, slowing movement to safe areas and increasing exposure to incoming waves [1,4]. In some contexts, evacuation has also introduced additional risks. In Kodiak, Alaska, for example, one evacuee was killed in a hit and run incident during a tsunami evacuation, highlighting how overwhelmed infrastructure can turn evacuation itself into a source of danger [5].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2018 Sulawesi tsunami further illustrates how evacuation challenges disproportionately affect vulnerable populations. Research notes that elderly individuals and those with limited mobility required more time to evacuate, contributing to increased risk in already hazardous conditions [4]. When evacuation routes are congested, poorly designed, or insufficiently planned, these groups face heightened exposure to injury and death.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These findings underscore the need for urban planners and disaster management practitioners to integrate tsunami risk into development planning. More specifically, researchers have called for critical facilities such as schools, hospitals, and nursing homes to be located outside high-risk coastal zones [4]. Road design and capacity must also be considered in evacuation planning, with targeted road widening and evacuation drills assisting in identifying potential bottlenecks before an event occurs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

These case studies demonstrate that, despite the safety nets established through disaster risk reduction strategies, important gaps remain due to technological limitations and urban constraints. Improving detection capabilities for non-seismic induced tsunamis, alongside evacuation-informed urban planning in disaster-prone regions, is therefore essential for reducing loss of life during tsunami events. These insights underscore the need for sustained investment in both technological innovation and integrated disaster and urban planning as core components of tsunami preparedness strategies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

– Abraham Alexander<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[1] Takabatake, T., Shibayama, T., Esteban, M., Achiari, H., Nurisman, N., Gelfi, M., Tarigan, T. A., Kencana, E. R., Fauzi, M. A. R., Panalaran, S., Harnantyari, A. S., & Kyaw, T. O. (2019). Field survey and evacuation behaviour during the 2018 Sunda Strait tsunami. Coastal Engineering Journal, 61(4), 423\u2013443. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/21664250.2019.1647963<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2] Syamsidik, S., Benazir, B., Umar, M., Margaglio, G., & Fitrayansyah, A. (2019). Post-tsunami survey of the 28 September 2018 tsunami near Palu Bay in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia: Impacts and challenges to coastal communities. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 38, 101229. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.ijdrr.2019.101229<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3] the tsunami, with a major emphasis on risk awareness and evacuation behaviours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Harrison, S. E., Lawson, R. V., Kaiser, L., Potter, S. H., & Johnston, D. (2025). Understanding mariners\u2019 tsunami information needs and decision-making contexts: A post-event case study of the 2022 Tonga eruption and tsunami. IScience, 28(2), 111801. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.isci.2025.111801<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4] Harnantyari, A. S., Takabatake, T., Esteban, M., Valenzuela, P., Nishida, Y., Shibayama, T., Achiari, H., Rusli, Marzuki, A. G., Marzuki, M. F. H., Ar\u00e1nguiz, R., & Kyaw, T. O. (2020). Tsunami awareness and evacuation behaviour during the 2018 Sulawesi Earthquake tsunami. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 43, 101389. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.ijdrr.2019.101389<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5] Venua, B. (2023, July 18). Kodiak resident dies in hit-and-run during Saturday\u2019s tsunami evacuation. Alaska Public Media; AKPM. https:\/\/alaskapublic.org\/2023\/07\/18\/kodiak-resident-dies-in-hit-and-run-during-saturdays-tsunami-evacuation<\/a>\/. Sourced from: https:\/\/www.ngdc.noaa.gov\/hazel\/view\/hazards\/tsunami\/event-more-info\/5883<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In my previous blog post, I explored how disaster risk reduction strategies such as early warning systems, tsunami awareness, and education and outreach activities have helped reduce fatalities during tsunami events. However, the case studies reviewed during my summer 2025 research with the Disaster Lab show that, much like a sieve or colander, these protective […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":363,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-505","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":"news-5"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/505","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/363"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=505"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/505\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":512,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/505\/revisions\/512"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=505"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=505"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/thedisasterlab\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=505"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}