by Rob McRae, Director
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies
The headline of a recent survey conducted by the Globe and Mail and the Nanos pollsters stated that, “the best plan for the Canadian economy trumps fighting terrorists by more than 20 to 1 as an important election issue, say Canadians”. Given the attention the Government has devoted to highlighting the risk of terrorism, and the steps needed to confront it, this poll looks surprising to say the least.
But comparing the relative importance of the economy to terrorism is like comparing apples and oranges. Even motherhood would come a distant second to the economy when addressing key issues for the coming election. And the question put by the pollsters was how the best plan for the economy or terrorism would affect the outcome of the election. Canadians are naturally much more interested in the Government’s economic plan, or budget, than they are about the security strategy to tackle terrorism. Budgets affect everyone, and we have all become pretty good at understanding what’s at stake for each of us personally, and for the economy.
Security strategies are different. Whether it is a matter of the measures necessary to protect us at home, or military strategies conducted overseas, the Canadian public is often prepared to give the government of the day the benefit of the doubt.
But the polling result also reflects the fact that there has not been a well-informed and sustained public debate about Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy to date. There are arguably several reasons for this. Though the Government has spent a considerable effort in highlighting the risks, there remain important issues that deserve a lot more attention, especially during an election campaign.
What are some of the key questions that remain unanswered in the debate so far?
The first is whether or not we have a real strategy to fight terrorism. From the Government’s perspective, its stated strategy includes measures to “prevent, detect, deny, and respond” to terrorism. But the real substance of that strategy, at least in terms of where the PM and his Minsters have put the emphasis to date, is made up of two initiatives which contain the bulk of new measures: the various provisions contained in what was known as Bill C-51 which, among other things, gave CSIS new powers; and the military mission, where the Government has contributed 6 Hornets to the US-led international coalition to attack the Islamic State, first in Iraq and now in Syria as well. Together, we have the two priorities in a plan to tackle terrorism at home and abroad. Leaving aside, for a moment, the merits of each initiative, are these initiatives sufficiently integrated within an over-arching strategy? Are there other elements that are missing? In other words, have Canadians got the whole picture of our current counter-terrorism strategy, and do they understand how the various elements are supposed to work together? For example, what more is being done to prevent terrorism? There has been surprisingly little debate about this.
Despite all of the political debate in the House of Commons and elsewhere, is it clear for Canadians what is an effective counter-terrorism strategy? And if we claimed we had one, how would we know and how would we measure success?
Second, there has been a lot of emphasis on the threat of terrorism to Canadians and the corresponding need to take additional measures and to add new resources to the fight against it. Yet there has been surprisingly little discussion of the actual risk to Canadians of a terrorist attack in Canada relative to other risks. This is not an abstract question: if counter-terrorism is a priority, additional Government resources are committed to it and resources are reduced elsewhere, for example in counter-espionage, the fight against organized crime, or the cyber theft of intellectual property. So an accurate appreciation of the risk is important when considering policy trade-offs.
Interestingly, US experts have done some research on exactly this question. Most experts south of the border claim that the likelihood of an American citizen being the victim of a terrorist attack within the US is remote, by almost any measure. For example, the likelihood of being killed in a car crash or in a fall is far, far higher. On the basis of research done in the US, Americans are roughly twice as likely to be killed by lightening as by a terrorist attack. Though the risk of being killed in such an attack varies depending on a number of variables, research suggests it is something like one in 10-20 million. The risk of dying in a car crash in the US is closer to one in 20,000.
Recently, there has been research conducted in the US comparing the number of terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic jihadists and attacks carried out by right-wing extremists. Despite what many believe, this research indicates that terrorist attacks in the US committed by right-wing extremists out-number those committed by jihadists by about two to one.
What, then, is the story in Canada? Is the risk to Canadians of being the victim of a terrorist attack on Canadian territory significantly different from the risk in the US, or in the UK or Australia? Is the profile of terrorists in Canada similar that in the US (or UK or Australia)? What exactly is the risk to Canadians relative to other risks? More research is required to usefully inform public debate.
Third, whatever the actual risk, there is clearly a concern on the part of many Canadians about the threat posed by terrorism in Canada, and the Government acted accordingly by tabling Bill C-51. But if, on the basis of research in this country, we find that the risk to Canadians of being the victim of a terrorist attack is low, how do we explain the level of public concern about Islamic jihadist terrorism, relative to other risks? Part of the explanation is that people have discounted the risks involved in most day to day activities, such as driving a car. Nonetheless, even within the spectrum of terrorist acts, the threat posed by Islamic Jihadists seems to be of much greater public concern than that posed by right-wing extremists or any other groups in most Western societies.
How, then, is the political debate, and the media coverage of terrorist incidents in Canada, influencing public opinion? For example, is media reporting affecting how the threat of terrorism in Canada is perceived by the public and, if so, how is that being done and why? It would be foolish to deny that there is a risk of terrorist attacks in Canada, but have we put this into the proper perspective relative to other risks? The answers to these questions are not without real political weight. Convincing the public we are somehow “at war” tends to minimize other political issues and, historically, when we are at war, we are expected to put aside our differences and support our leaders.
Finally, at least so far, many Canadians seem to have given the benefit of the doubt to the Government with regard to the strategy behind the military mission to fight ISIS. What is surprising, however, is the fact that the mission itself appears to have disappeared from the headlines. If we are to understand the military mission as an integral part of Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy, it would be useful for our politicians to tell us a lot more about the mission in order to have an informed public debate.
We do know that Canadian component of the US-led coalition effort has conducted 1200 sorties. But it would be helpful to know more about the effectiveness of these sorties, and about how the overall strategy in Iraq and Syria is evolving.
The US Department of Defense website is quite full of details about the mission, and President Obama has articulated the strategy behind the effort. Much of this public information is instructive, from the fact that the targets are relatively minor (trucks, mortars, etc) to the fact that no forward spotters are in place to direct the bombing. Without spotters, the effectiveness of air strikes are often compromised, and the risk to civilians on the ground can be greater. The obvious question is how is that affecting the mission?
Moreover, the air strikes may be taking significant numbers of IS fighters off the battlefield, but if they are constantly being replaced by new recruits the strikes are not decisively shrinking the military capacity of ISIS. Of course the strike mission alone will never defeat ISIS, and is part of an integrated strategy that includes training and weapons supplies to the Iraqi military and Kurdish fighters, and political moves to build a more inclusive Iraqi Government. Nonetheless, it is clear that the strategy is still evolving, on the basis of lessons learned previously in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the ongoing conflict.
If we are to have the same level of debate here as we see in the US, we need more information about the mission and more discussion about the evolving strategy. What are our measures of success and our operational milestones? The risk of not entering into a dialogue with Canadians about this mission is that they will begin to fear that we have entered into an open-ended commitment. Simply put, more information can be made available, without compromising operational security, in order to have the informed public debate we need.
Does Canada have an effective counter-terrorism strategy? On the basis of the gaps in our knowledge, and the information we are missing, it is impossible to answer that question. Yet possessing the proper information to answer that question is key to the mature public debate we desperately need on this issue in the run-up to the election.
In the weeks ahead, we will take a closer look at each of these questions, from recent research in Canada that may provide some new insights, through to comparisons with some of our closest Allies, when it comes to the threat of terrorism and effective strategies to fight it.