Canada, the US, Russia and the Arctic – A Pragmatic Look
Andrea Charron
Making sense of the world these days is a bit like trying to drink from a fire hose; overwhelming doesn’t begin to describe the result. Everyone is questioning what are Canada’s options given a new US President and an aggressive Russia. Might Canada-US Arctic relations deteriorate? Might the Arctic cease to be a zone of cooperation? Might Canada be overtaken by events? This paper argues, essentially, “no” to all three questions. The way forward is for Canada to engage with all of the Arctic partners to ensure that other geopolitical events do not spillover and undo efforts to manage increased economic and tourist activity in the Arctic. Given that Canada is the least developed of all of the Arctic states, Canada would feel the effects of political tension among Arctic states the most.
The good news is that the latest US Department of Defense Arctic strategy starts with the statement: “The Department of Defense (DoD) remains committed to working collaboratively with allies and partners to promote a balanced approach to improving security in the Arctic region.” While written when President Obama was in the White House, there is indication that this sentiment will continue under the new administration. Many of the eight Arctic states are allies of the US while the biggest Arctic power, Russia, commands notice by Trump. Ultimately, the US wants the Arctic to remain a secure and stable region, where American national interests are safeguarded, its homeland is defended, and states work cooperatively to address challenges.
President Trump, in line with his emerging “grand” strategy, arguably wants to achieve these goals by spending more on the military. This is all to the potential benefit of Canada (notwithstanding the very real concerns for what these budget cuts will do for important UN programs), especially given that the Commander of USNORTHCOM, who is also the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), is the US Arctic capabilities advocate. For many years, Canada had to remind the US about its role as an Arctic state and even encouraged them to join the Arctic Council in 1996. But while some Canadians quickly conclude that US military spending could mean armed-to-the-teeth military vessels steaming down the Northwest Passage, this is not what increased spending in the Arctic should bring to mind.
Military capabilities support national interests, which encompass a wide range of activities, including economic, resource extraction, fishing and trade, support to civil authorities, scientific research, search and rescue as well as national defence. Indeed, one of the foci of the latest NORAD exercise (Vigilant Shield 2016) was Canadian and US forces working together, including sending NORAD aircraft to Thule, Greenland to see if this improves air surveillance and control in the Arctic. NORAD is considering how best to modernize (for example, updating/replacing/reconfiguring/reimaging the aged North Warning System and review northern basing requirements) and to evolve North American defence to address new threats farther out in time and space from the homeland. Political attention to NORAD has returned; NORAD was even mentioned in the Joint Statement made by US President Trump and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on 13 February 2017. NORAD’s sixtieth anniversary next year coupled with the Permanent Joint Board on Defense’s call for a study of the evolution of North American Defense (EVONAD) in all domains represents opportunities to reconsider what it means to defend Canada.
The most immediate need, however, is more icebreakers for both countries, although the US need is more acute. The US Coast Guard (USCG) only operates two icebreakers, the USCGC Healy and the Polar Star, which share duties in Antarctica and the Arctic. Therefore, rumours that the USCG (under Homeland Security but also the fifth branch of the US military) may actually receive a 10 percent budget cut would be disastrous. It is badly underfunded already risking the protection of 95,000 miles of American coastline, not to mention aid with resupply to Arctic communities and the McMurdo Research Station in Antarctica.
What will be an adjustment for Canada-US relations in the Arctic is the shift away from uniting on issues of climate change to issues of responsible resource extraction and tourism. Trump is keen to allow oil and gas exploration to proceed in Alaska. Exploration in Canada’s Arctic, however, is still unlikely in the near future given a number of factors including: the government’s moratorium on new Arctic oil and gas drilling licenses; Royal Dutch Shell’s relinquishment of its drilling leases in Canada’s Lancaster Sound, transferring them to Nature Conservancy Canada; sluggish oil prices; Canada’s relatively fewer gas and oil deposits compared to elsewhere in the Arctic; and the Trudeau government’s pledge to protect more marine spaces. Nevertheless, responsible resource development and protection of the environment remain the mandates of the Arctic Council. And all indications are that the US will continue to participate in this forum, even if less enthusiastically than was the case under the Obama administration.
The other area of convergence is the growth of Arctic tourism. The very successful, but government resource-intensive and expensive transit of the luxury cruise liner the Crystal Serenity from Anchorage, Alaska, through the Northwest Passage to Thule, Greenland and then New York last summer, is set to be repeated this summer at an average cost per passenger of over $20,000. This requires very close coordination with coast guards, customs and border personnel, and the militaries (for aerial search and rescue scenarios) of the US, Canada, and Denmark. A military confrontation between these states is obviously not a concern. Rather, it is the more mundane issues that demand larger government resources that require more attention. This includes ensuring adequate navigational aids, more charting, designating a route that limits disruption to migrating marine species, enforcing the now mandatory Polar Code, and even coordinating penalties for marine pollution and dumping between the US, Canada, and Greenland/Denmark, which will help to ensure that the less professional, fly-by-night companies aren’t encouraged to dump in jurisdictions with softer penalties, not to mention protection of the newly found Franklin ships from poachers. Working with the US and Greenland/Denmark to coordinate future voyages will continue to be an important point of convergence given this popular tourist route.
For Canadians, however, nothing grabs the headlines like concerns for Russia’s presumed nefarious designs on the Arctic. Such assertions are made despite Russia having demonstrated that it has adhered to international law with respect to Arctic issues (e.g., the Ilulissat Declaration of the five Arctic coastal states, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], which the US has yet to adopt formally, and the process for delimiting extended continental shelves). Russia’s activities in Syria and Ukraine are presented as evidence of its intent to threaten the Arctic with military confrontation as well. We need to unpack this slippery slope connection.
First, the activities of Russia in Syria and Ukraine are reprehensible. Full stop. Yes, Russia has the potential to hit major North American centres with an arsenal of missiles. Yet such actions are not de facto evidence of designs around the globe, or particularly for the Arctic. Russia is certainly opportunistic, seizing on frozen conflicts from the Cold War as well as undermining and exploiting states in its near abroad, especially those with pro-Russian and usually authoritarian leadership that have populations that could be fractured along national lines. The Arctic does not fit this profile. Russia mythologizes its Arctic to posit a singular history of pride in overcoming adversity (failing to mention much of the North was developed under the Gulag system with prisoners), conveniently glossing over growing ethnic divides among its minority groups and a very tense relationship with its own indigenous peoples. Canada also frames its Arctic to suit its myths – one that is devoid of English and French differences and unique from the rest of Canada while also tending to overlook the peoples who live there.
Second, Russia has high hopes that the Arctic will be a potential fix for what is looking like deep economic malaise. With three large rivers the length of the Mississippi draining into the Arctic basin and a Northern Sea Route that links Russia to China and Europe, Russia is hoping its port cities, like Murmansk, oil and gas resources, and the Northern Sea Route are the economic engines that will save the Russian economy. We’ll have to wait and see if this actually materializes. Analysts who claim Russia is “grabbing” extra territory would do well to remember that Russia has made its submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for review. Canada has yet to complete its Arctic submission (only its Atlantic submission) and the US is not a party to UNCLOS.
As well, it is important to remember that the extended continental shelf, however delimited, gives the coastal state first rights to resources on and below the ocean floor – not the waters or air space above. In other words, the process does not extend territorial waters or exclusive economic zones and the high seas will remain the high seas. Any statements to the contrary are false and misleading. Furthermore, we need to remember that Russia has maritime boundary agreements with both Norway and the US. The latter Agreement extends to cover whatever shelf area exists for the two States beyond 200 nautical miles. Russia has indicated in diplomatic correspondence available on the CLCS website to both Canada and Denmark that there is a need to resolve possible continental shelf overlaps eventually. Also, a quick look at the Russian submission to the CLCS indicates that Russia did not “claim” as much seafloor area as it might have – in particular with regards to the Gakkel Ridge. The Russians appear to be acting consistently with the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS. This is to be encouraged.
Third, the Arctic is a region that Russia dominates because of the size of its Arctic territory, its large Arctic population and its 41+ icebreakers (6 of which are heavy polar, nuclear powered vessels). The Arctic is the one issue area in which it is a peer to the US. Indeed, Russia is the Arctic power. Its expansion/refurbishment of its northern bases is not entirely unlike Canadian and US spending on military equipment and bases – as a source of economic stimulus, among other reasons. More to the point, Russia’s general military buildup is a convenient way to whip up nationalism and divert its public’s attention away from the lack of services, increasingly closed government, and poor results in nearly all measures of health and economic status. While Russia has emerged as the third largest defence spender in the world, this level is still dwarfed by American defence spending. The US spent $US 596,024 million in 2015 on defence vs Russia’s $US 91,081 million in 2015 – representing a 6.5 times factor on defence spending. Nevertheless, the fact that Russia is better able to monitor its vast Arctic, with nodes and networks of bases and forward operating locations, means NATO allies needs to improve and expand surveillance and share information.
The military expansion and buildup must be tracked, of course. Russia has the greatest strategic latitude to operate in the Arctic. Scandinavian and European partners are particularly weary of Russian intentions; everyone is rediscovering their deterrence and containment theory textbooks. NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Bradshaw recently described the likelihood of a military confrontation with Russia as low but added “there is a very small risk and because the consequences would be catastrophic, we have absolutely got to deal with the risks.” To put it in the starkest of terms, if spillover from other conflicts results in Russia escalating, it could choose the Arctic as a target to force the US to deescalate elsewhere in the world. The Alliance, in turn, could invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In such a scenario, war is a possibility.
That being said, Russia does not want to engage NATO directly; rather it seeks to create disunity among NATO and European Union allies. Maintaining capabilities and working with Russia, therefore, is a way of ensuring that activities in the Arctic do not increase risks of opportunistic escalation, ensuring allies work together more regularly as well as reducing tensions elsewhere. Not only is Russia essential to tackling some of the common issues in the Arctic, like improving health indicators, telecommunication, and important scientific research, but it represents a safer topic on which other geopolitical issues can be broached.
So where does this leave Canada?
Neither Canada nor the US can operate self-sufficiently in the Arctic should there be a major search and rescue or fuel spill scenario from a crippled ship, for example. The militaries need to work collaboratively via many hundreds of bilateral agreements, including the binational NORAD Agreement and with other government departments (like the US Arctic Research Commission, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Homeland Security, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Transportation Canada, etc.), which remain the lead departments in the North American Arctic. Both states need to fund their Coast Guards properly and gain greater icebreaking capabilities; despite a warming climate, multi-year and pack ice remain navigational hazards that will damage military and commercial vessels requiring more icebreaking services, not less. Canada and the US also need the help of allies and partners – in the case of the Arctic, that necessarily means Russia.
As Finland replaces the US as Chair of the Arctic Council in May for 2017 – 2019, all Arctic and non-Arctic Observer states need to reconfirm their focus on key issues of environmental protection and sustainable development. Most importantly, the US and Russia must try to seek opportunities for dialogue by building on the cooperation that already exists in the Arctic. So far, the Arctic remains relatively untouched from the rising tension that has marred relations with Russia in other parts of the world, from Ukraine to Syria. Canada and its allies have an interest in ensuring that relations in the Arctic do not deteriorate further, much as they have done so elsewhere. At the same time, Canada needs to continue tracking military developments in the Arctic, improve its surveillance and information-sharing, and avoid linkages with other areas of the world of actual and potential military confrontation, lest it leads to escalation. Dialogue can have a strategic purpose, and need not be naïve. A pragmatic Canada would seek every opportunity to encourage such talks.