Securing Canada’s Arctic: A Strategic Imperative for Multi-Use, Multi-User Infrastructure in a New Era of Geopolitical Threats
Canada’s Arctic has shifted from a remote frontier to a critical national and international security flashpoint. A recent assessment from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) underscores that Canada’s Arctic is being actively targeted by adversaries seeking to exploit the region’s sparse infrastructure, fragile environment, and limited surveillance capabilities (Tunney, 2024). This increased attention aligns with broader trends of climate change accelerating access to new Arctic shipping routes, growing interest in resource extraction, and expanded military footprints by both Russia and China.
Canada now faces a strategic imperative: will we actively shape the future of the Arctic through resilient, integrated infrastructure and governance models, or leave it vulnerable to external forces – for another few decades?
Multi-Use, Multi-User Infrastructure: A Modern Arctic Model
The need for multi-use, multi-user infrastructure in Canada’s Arctic infrastructure that serves overlapping military, civilian, Indigenous, scientific, and economic purposes is clear. Through Carleton’s IPIS/NPSIA’s Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment course (CIRA) we’re exploring the deployment of Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs) at Arctic military bases, providing clean, reliable, resilient power for military readiness, community development, and research support. This type of infrastructure is adaptable to emergency response, economic activity, and national defence and enhances sovereignty while contributing to regional sustainability and security.
This aligns directly with the Canadian Department of National Defence’s (2019) Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, which highlights the need for dual-use infrastructure that strengthens both security and community resilience. The framework stresses that Arctic security is inseparable from the well-being of Arctic communities, underscoring the importance of integrated planning where defence infrastructure also serves economic, social, and environmental purposes (Canadian Department of National Defence, 2019).
Revisiting the Dome: Historical Lessons in Resilient Arctic Design
This vision for multi-purpose Arctic hubs isn’t new. In 1958, Canadian planners envisioned a concrete-domed town in Iqaluit, fully enclosed to withstand Arctic weather while supporting military and civilian populations alike (CBC News, 2014). While technologically impractical today, the underlying concept of infrastructure designed for both strategic defence and community sustainability remains relevant. The Arctic’s future lies in dual-purpose, climate-adapted infrastructure that integrates military, research, economic, and community needs.
Emerging Threat Environment: Urgent Need for Action
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (SECD) 2023 Arctic Security Report paints a sobering picture: climate change, increased foreign presence in Arctic waters, and Russia’s Arctic military buildup have dramatically raised the regions vulnerability. New threats include hypersonic missiles, long-range cruise missiles, and advanced cyber operations, many of which could exploit gaps in Canada’s surveillance and response infrastructure (SECD, 2023).
The U.S. Department of Defense (2022) Arctic Strategy echoes these concerns, stressing that the Arctic is now an operational theatre for strategic competition, requiring enhanced domain awareness, military presence, and dual-purpose infrastructure capable of supporting both security and local resilience (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022). Both Canadian and U.S. strategies emphasize the critical need for multi-domain awareness and infrastructure that can simultaneously support military operations and community well-being.
Human Security and Infrastructure: A Broader Definition of Sovereignty
Traditional, southern-centric models of critical infrastructure planning designed for urban environments doesn’t work in the Arctic. Major Daniel Arsenault (2022) argues that critical infrastructure protection in the Arctic must shift to a human security framework, where infrastructure resilience is directly tied to the safety, health, and economic well-being of Arctic residents (Arsenault, 2022). In this model, a failure in critical infrastructure isn’t just a technical gap, it’s a sovereignty vulnerability, creating openings for adversaries to exploit.
This thinking aligns with the Canadian Northern Corridor concept described by Katharina Koch (2022). Her work stresses that piecemeal, project-by-project approaches to Arctic infrastructure have failed precisely because they overlook regional diversity, Indigenous knowledge, and holistic planning needs (Koch, 2022). A coordinated, pan-Canadian corridor strategy, designed with Indigenous leadership and grounded in community needs, is essential for resilient, sustainable infrastructure that supports sovereignty and development.
Differentiating the North: Avoiding One-Size-Fits-All
One of Canada’s greatest Arctic policy failures has been the application of southern-designed, one-size-fits-all solutions to vastly different regions. As Koch (2022) notes, the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019) called for exactly this shift, moving from Ottawa-imposed projects to co-developed, regionally tailored solutions grounded in Indigenous governance and traditional knowledge (Koch, 2022; Canadian Department of National Defence, 2019).
The Standing Senate Committee also highlighted that Indigenous participation must be embedded in all Arctic security and infrastructure initiatives, ensuring that infrastructure investments contribute to self-determination, cultural preservation, and economic opportunity, not just national defence (SECD, 2023).
Whole-of-Society Arctic Resilience: A National Priority
Canada’s future Arctic infrastructure must embody whole-of-society resilience, where every investment serves multiple purposes:
- Military surveillance and domain awareness.
- Emergency response and climate disaster management.
- Sustainable energy and economic development.
- Community health, housing, and connectivity.
- Scientific research on climate change and environmental monitoring.
This multi-use, multi-user approach isn’t just good governance, it’s a strategic necessity in an era where Arctic sovereignty, climate adaptation, and economic opportunity are fundamentally intertwined.
The Path Forward: Canada at a Crossroads
As CSIS has warned, the Arctic is already a strategic target (Tunney, 2024). The only question is whether Canada will proactively build the infrastructure and partnerships needed to project strength, resilience, and stewardship or whether we will leave the door open for another couple of decades for adversaries to exploit our gaps.
At NC-CIPSeR, we believe the time to act is now, and we invite partners from government, industry, Indigenous communities, and academia to join us in these conversations.
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References
Arsenault, D. (2022). Waiting for black swans: Why critical infrastructure in the Arctic needs a new security approach. Canadian Forces College.
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (2014, September 17). Under the dome: 1958 plan for Iqaluit was town under concrete shell. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/under-the-dome-1958-plan-for-iqaluit-was-town-under-concrete-shell-1.2763922
Canadian Department of National Defence. (2019). Arctic and northern policy framework: Safety, security, and defence chapter. Government of Canada.https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1562939617400/1562939658000
Koch, K. (2022). Differentiating the Canadian North for coherent infrastructure development. The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary. https://doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v15i1.74249
Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. (2023). Arctic security under threat: Urgent needs in a changing geopolitical and environmental landscape.Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent needs in a changing geopolitical and environmental landscape
Tunney, C. (2024, March 4). Adversaries see opportunities to exploit strategically valuable Arctic, CSIS says. CTV News. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/article/adversaries-see-opportunities-to-exploit-strategically-valuable-arctic-csis-says/
U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). Department of Defense Arctic strategy. DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF