Small Modular Reactors to Power Northern Development Require New Approaches to Infrastructure Security

Introduction
Across the Canadian Arctic, energy is inseparable from survival. Electricity and heat in northern regions are not matters of convenience but conditions of life and death. Extreme cold, prolonged winter darkness, and geographic isolation demand reliable, predictable, and secure power systems. Yet today, most northern and Arctic communities and virtually all major industrial operations remain dependent on diesel generation. This dependence comes at staggering operational, financial, environmental, and security costs.

As Canada looks to new technologies to reduce these burdens, small modular reactors (SMRs) have emerged as a promising complement or alternative to diesel-based microgrids. Their ability to deliver long-lived, emissions-free, high-capacity power makes them technologically suitable for mines, remote communities, and strategic sites. The 2018 Canadian Roadmap for Small Modular Reactors[1] formally recognized this potential, emphasizing the importance of “remote deployment,” “security,” and anchoring Canadian leadership in advanced manufacturing, cybersecurity, materials science, and remote operation.

However, replacing diesel with SMRs will not simply substitute one energy source for another. Rather, it will transform the underlying critical infrastructure interdependencies that northern operations depend upon. Diesel’s foremost dependency is transportation. SMRs, particularly when deployed in remote regions, shift that dependency toward telecommunications—specifically, toward secure, resilient, and sovereign digital networks capable of enabling remote monitoring, diagnostics, control, and emergency response.

This shift presents a challenge Canada is not yet prepared for. Canada’s telecommunications systems already exhibit deep structural vulnerabilities.

Do we as Canadians have control over our own telecommunications CI?
Canadian critical infrastructures generally, not just the artic infrastructures, are heavily exposed to vulnerabilities associated with cross-border telecommunications flows and ownership. For instance, the largest business input to Canadian financial services is what Statistics Canada calls “Computer and Design Services”—an amalgam of cloud and software services; 50% of these services are imported, and 80% of those imports come from the United States.[2]  At a higher level, 50% of Canadian-to-Canadian internet connection-paths leave Canada and then return in what is called a ‘boomerang” route, making them subject to interception or denial of service; another 50% of Internet Exchange Points (network junctions – IXPs) used by Canadians to reach each other are outside Canada, and therefore vulnerable to further at-will surveillance or disruption.[3] Finally, 100% of all CDNs used to scale and deliver critical services such as e-government, online banking, news, and media for Canadian consumers are under the control of foreign entities, and ultimately foreign governments[4].

Legislative threats from trading partners underscore this risk. The Cloud Act from 2018[5] gives the U.S. government authority to obtain digital data controlled by U.S.-based tech corporations, regardless of whether that data is in motion or stored, on servers at home or on foreign soil. In 2023, the European Council confirmed agreement with the European Parliament on new rules to improve cross-border access to “e-evidence”, giving European governments abilities akin to those granted by the U.S. Cloud Act[6]. As little as a year ago, the prospect of CI like datacentres, cloud-services, IXPs or CDNs being deliberately compromised or disabled sounded far-fetched to most Canadians. Recent history has shown that the previously unthinkable can no longer be dismissed.

These vulnerabilities have implications not only for privacy or financial transactions but increasingly for national security, particularly when critical systems such as SMRs become reliant on remote operation and real-time digital control flows.

To deploy SMRs safely and securely in northern Canada, telecommunications resiliency, security, and sovereignty must be elevated to foundational infrastructure requirements—not afterthoughts.

The Cost and Fragility of Diesel Dependence
Diesel generation has long been the default solution in the Arctic because it is simple, familiar, and comparatively easy to deploy. Yet its limitations are well documented:
1. Diesel dominates Arctic imports.
In many northern regions, diesel fuel accounts for 18% to 32% of the total value of all imports. Every litre must be transported thousands of kilometres by truck, barge, or winter road[7].
2. Diesel supply chains are brittle.
Marine shipping windows are narrow, highly weather-dependent, and subject to unpredictable disruption. Winter roads are increasingly unstable due to climate change. The result is over-provisioning, stockpiling, and high distribution costs—all of which strain community finances and industrial margins.
3. Diesel is prohibitively expensive.
A single large mine site can spend $10 million per year on diesel fuel alone, excluding generator maintenance, replacement capital, and environmental mitigation. Over a 40-year project life, the total cost of diesel-based power can exceed half a billion dollars for a single industrial site. [8]
4. Diesel has environmental and social impacts.
Beyond greenhouse gas emissions, diesel leaks and storage risks impose environmental burdens on fragile Arctic ecosystems and require costly remediation.

Together, these challenges create powerful incentives to transition toward alternative baseload power systems—motivating current interest in SMRs.

Why SMRs for the North?
SMRs offer several advantages uniquely suited to remote and Arctic deployment:
-Long refuelling intervals (5–20 years depending on design)
-High energy density relative to logistical footprint
-Continuous baseload output suitable for mines, communities, and defence installations
-Compatibility with district heating and industrial process needs
-Potential co-location with hydrogen production or mineral processing

The Canadian SMR Roadmap explicitly highlights remote and mining use cases, arguing that SMRs could enhance energy independence and reduce reliance on imported diesel.

However, these advantages come with structural requirements that differ markedly from diesel-based systems. SMRs, especially those deployed in remote locations, depend on specialized technical oversight, continuous environmental and performance monitoring, and rapid access to nuclear engineering expertise. These requirements cannot be met through on-site staffing alone in remote territories. Instead, modern SMR operating models rely on:
-Remote monitoring
-Remote diagnostics
-Remote operator-support

These features reduce the need for on-site nuclear specialists but dramatically increase the importance of telecommunications.

The New Dependency: Telecommunications Instead of Transportation
Where diesel depends on transportation infrastructure, SMRs depend on telecommunications infrastructure. The shift is not trivial: it alters security assumptions, supply-chain risks, regulatory needs, and emergency-response planning.
1. Resilience: More than a Single Satellite Link
Today, northern telecommunications overwhelmingly rely on a small number of satellite providers. While low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations, such as Telesat Lightspeed[9], promise improved reliability, satellite systems remain vulnerable to:
-Jamming
-Space weather
-Orbital congestion
-Foreign manufacturer influence
-Ground station outages

For SMRs, redundancy must be engineered to the level used in aviation or defence:
-Two independent satellite providers at minimum
-Preferably triple-redundant architectures, including
-Satellite + terrestrial fibre + microwave, where feasible
-Independent routing paths
-Geopolitically diverse uplinks

Emerging fibre projects, including the Eastern Arctic Underwater Fibre Optic Network[10] and the Kivalliq Hydro-Fibre Link[11], offer important opportunities. The proposed Kivalliq link—a 1,200-kilometre transmission–fibre corridor from Churchill, Manitoba to Nunavut—would deliver both power and broadband capacity to Arviat, Whale Cove, Rankin Inlet, Chesterfield Inlet, and Baker Lake. Its value extends beyond community broadband; it could become critical enabling infrastructure for SMR deployments in Nunavut and surrounding regions[12].

2. Security: SMRs Require Quantum-Safe Remote Operations
If SMRs are to be monitored and controlled remotely, the cybersecurity posture of their communications networks becomes mission-critical.

The National Quantum Strategy (2022)[13] warns that quantum computing threatens widely used public-key cryptography. When these algorithms fail, attackers may:
-Masquerade as authorized operators
-Intercept confidential messages
-Inject or alter messages
-Jam or otherwise deny service

For SMRs, such risks cannot be tolerated. Communications systems must be:
-Encrypted end-to-end using quantum-safe or cryptographically agile algorithms
-Designed to fail safely on communication loss
-Audited under nuclear-grade cybersecurity standards (e.g., CSA N290.7:21[14])
-Verified through supply-chain security assessments, with restrictions on foreign-state influence

Satellite operators, equipment vendors, and network providers must demonstrate that their systems cannot be subject to manipulation by foreign intelligence or commercial interests.

3. Sovereignty: Control over the Infrastructure Underpinning Safety
Telecommunications sovereignty is not merely a commercial or privacy concern—it is a national-security imperative when critical systems rely on remote digital links.

As mentioned earlier:
-50% of Canada-to-Canada internet paths “boomerang” through the U.S. or Europe.
-50% of Canadian internet exchange points (IXPs) used for domestic routes are located outside Canada.
-100% of the content delivery networks (CDNs) used by Canadian governments, banks, and critical services are foreign-owned.
-U.S. and European providers are subject to the CLOUD Act or EU e-evidence laws, enabling lawful access to Canadian data.

For SMRs, such dependencies create unacceptable risk:
-Remote control links could be intercepted or manipulated outside Canadian jurisdiction.
-Data routing through foreign networks introduces exposure to foreign surveillance.
-Outages or traffic shaping by foreign providers could degrade operational integrity.
-Canada would lack effective recourse in the event of a geopolitical dispute.

In effect, SMRs cannot rely on telecommunications channels that Canada does not control. Sovereign operation requires:
-Canadian-owned satellite solutions, or
-Canadian-controlled terrestrial fibre, or
-At minimum, routing architectures that ensure Canadian-only pathways for operational data.

Telecommunications as the Zero-Order Requirement
A critical insight emerges from comparing SMR requirements with the realities of northern telecommunications:
Canada currently lacks the resilient, secure, and sovereign digital infrastructure needed to support remote nuclear power.

This is not a sequencing dilemma; it is a mathematical order-of-operations problem.

Telecommunications must come first. SMRs must come second.

Canada has historically underestimated the strategic role of telecommunications infrastructure in national security. Control over communications infrastructure was once considered a core instrument of wartime sovereignty; exemplified by the British cutting German telegraph cables in 1914 to shape geopolitical outcomes[15]. The modern equivalents are data centres, cloud services, satellite networks, IXPs, and CDNs, all of which Canada relies on but few of which Canada controls.

SMRs introduce a new category of infrastructure that depends on secure telecommunications, thereby increasing the importance of regaining sovereign control over digital networks.

Conclusion
SMRs offer transformative potential for northern development, mining, community energy independence, and national sovereignty. But their success hinges on an critical infrastructure foundation Canada has not yet built.
To realize the benefits of SMRs in the Arctic, Canada must first invest in:
1. Resilient telecommunications
-Multi-path, redundant satellite and terrestrial systems
-Infrastructure that is hardened against interference, weather, and foreign influence
2. Secure telecommunications
-End-to-end quantum-safe encryption
-Verified and trusted supply chains
3. Sovereign telecommunications
-Canadian-domiciled routing
-Canadian ownership or operational control of critical links
-Digital autonomy for remote industrial and nuclear operations

Without these capabilities, SMRs cannot be safely or securely deployed in northern Canada. The sequence is unambiguous: telecommunications first—then SMRs.
 


[1] https://smrroadmap.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SMRroadmap_EN_nov6_Web-1.pdf
[2] https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/catalogue/15-207-X
[3] https://pulse.internetsociety.org/en/ixp-tracker/country/CA/
[4] https://www.wmtips.com/technologies/cdn/country/ca/
[5] https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4943
[6] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/25/electronic-evidence-council-confirms-agreement-with-the-european-parliament-on-new-rules-to-improve-cross-border-access-to-e-evidence/
[7] Ibid. StatsCan
[8] https://carleton.ca/cipser/smrsecurityblog-2/is-going-nuclear-good-for-critical-resource-extraction/
 
[9] https://www.telesat.com/leo-satellites/
[10] https://krg.ca/en-CA/assets/Council/2024/May/EAUFON.pdf
[11] https://nukik.ca/khf/
[12] https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-kivalliq-hydro-fibre-link-arctic-sovereignty-nunavut-major-projects/
[13] https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/national-quantum-strategy/en/canadas-national-quantum-strategy
[14] https://www.csagroup.org/store/product/2428461/
[15] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimmermann_telegram