EVENT REPORT: The The Rediscovery of Great Power Politics, Presented by Dr. Sven Biscop

Overview: This hybrid event was held at Carleton University aon Monday, April 7, 2025, from 4:00 pm to 5:30 pm, and co-hosted by the Eastern Europe and Transatlantic Network (EETN) and the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence. The event featured a 50-minute lecture followed by a 40-minute Q&A discussion. Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop gave a compelling and timely lecture on the shifting realities of international politics, starting with Trump’s second presidency, followed by what it means for four key areas: Ukraine policy, European defence architecture, European decision-making, and global power politics.

Speaker: Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, lectures at Ghent University and leads the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels. He is a member of the Royal Academy for Overseas Sciences of Belgium and an honorary fellow of the European Security and Defence College of the EU.

Lecture summary: After the actions taken by US President Donald Trump’s administration, Dr. Biscop emphasized that we must stop relying on incremental responses, rather than committing to preparing for worst-case scenarios and forging an independent path forward for Europe. He outlined three of his guiding principles on which decision-makers can ground their strategies going forward: Trump will continue siding with Putin; there is the possibility of a J.D Vance’s presidency following Trump; Europe will be left on its own if there is to be a conventional war with Russia. Dr. Biscop elaborated on the following four key points:

Ukraine Policy

In response to Trump’s sidelining of both Ukraine and its allies, all the while undermining NATO solidarity, Europe must take the lead in shaping Ukraine’s security and future. Dr. Biscop argued that increasing defence spending and uniting Europe will aid in securing the continent rather than retrenching within national borders.

Europe should continue the EU accession process for Ukraine, maintain its independent sanction policy, and provide military support via the “coalition of the willing.”

Establishing a reassurance force to provide a security guarantee to deter further Russian aggression, ensuring Ukraine’s future security after a potential ceasefire.

Abandoning Ukraine would risk losing Moldova, Georgia, and other strategic access to the resources of Caucasus and connection with Central Asia while allowing Russia to expand its influence in eastern Europe.

If a ceasefire is reached, confirmation through the UN Security Council would be a novel way of pressuring China while ensuring Russian compliance given it would be politically difficult to veto their own ceasefire.

European Defense and Security Architecture

The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has fallen short due to its internal paradox – European governments do not trust a scheme for the harmonization of defence planning that does not include the US. However, it is vital that this scheme is implemented as the US may not join. Currently, without the strategic power that US provides, Europe has a sizeable force that is unable to achieve full operational coherency.

• Developing a European pillar within NATO and its defence planning process (not an EU-only pillar) ensures operational readiness without US support.
• Reaching military autonomy would require a shared investment in large-scale defence capabilities lasting at least 5 to 10 years, but planning must start now.
• The UK and France – Europe’s two nuclear powers – must be at the core, with other non-EU states like Canada, welcomed into the defence industrial framework through flexible cooperation.
• The role of the EU is to supports its member states to meet these targets by relaxing budgetary regulation, investing in the defence industry through the EU’s budget, reforming the borrowing power of member states, and facilitating coordination between member and partner states.
• Dr. Biscop emphasized the value of France’s independent nuclear arsenal, suggesting that an expanded French guarantee – co-funded by those under its protection – may be a viable path to a European nuclear backstop, while also prompting a reassessment of the UK’s American-dependent nuclear deterrent.

European Decision-Making

The European security architecture is complex and there is no single place to discuss all relevant aspects. Additionally, the current decision-making framework within the EU and NATO, which requires consensus or unanimity, is not agile enough to respond to today’s fast-moving geopolitical environment and crises. That is why an ad hoc format of the “coalition of the willing” must be implemented.

• The de facto war cabinet sits within the coalition of the willing and would include key states like France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Poland, alongside institutional leaders.
• Non-EU countries like Canada and Turkey could be closely associated, as their involvement brings additional weight, legitimacy, military capability, and industrial mass.
• Such a coalition could eventually influence NATO’s command structure so that even if the US no longer wishes to act as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), Europeans can assume full and independent operational control.

Impact on the Great Power Politics

The world is not entering a “new” order, but rather returning to a multipolar system where great powers constantly compete, cooperate, and rival with each other, with the balance of power is consistently shifting. Furthermore, the unique post-WWII transatlantic alliance is unravelling, especially under Trump’s transactional approach, which may weaken trust and embolden adversaries.

Europe and Canada still have the resources, capabilities, and strategic options to act.

The erosion of US commitment to its allies signals that security guarantees can no longer be taken for granted, making the global environment more volatile.

The US under Trump is not replacing one alliance with another but with transactionalism.

China is neither a friend nor an enemy of Europe. There exists a plethora of issues that Europe and China can work cooperatively on, while remaining cautious and conditional in it approach.

Europe must now reinforce ties with like-minded middle powers, such as Canada and Global South countries, who share an interest in maintaining a rules-based international order and avoiding a global cold war between US and China.

The retreating of the US and its undermining of multilateral architecture raises the question of whether a multilateral system is viable without US.