Russia’s Bifurcated Foreign Policy: International Arctic Forum and Reputation Laundering

The Arctic city of Murmansk hosted the 2025 International Arctic Forum (IAF) from March 26 to March 27. First inaugurated in 2010 as Russia’s foremost internationally oriented platform on Arctic development, it experienced rapid growth in attendance throughout the 2010s, from 300 attendees in 2010 to 3600 in 2019, including delegations from 52 countries and the heads of state of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland. In 2025, following a six-year hiatus, the Forum drew 1300 attendees with international representatives from just three countries—China, Iran, and Japan—according to The Jamestown Foundation. Russian media also reported on the participation of Norwegian diplomat Morten Høglund, chair of the Arctic Council, whose virtual greeting commented on the need for “international cooperation and collective action” in the Arctic. 

In his customary address to the Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined Russia’s policy commitments in the Arctic. These included the development of master plans for Arctic cities, the enhancement of terrestrial and maritime transportation, support for regional social programs, and many others. He also commented on the aggressive and, in his view, unwarranted posturing of Western nations in the Arctic. He cited US threats to annex Greenland as consistent with US foreign policy interests in the island since the 1860s but eagerly clarified that Russia has no interest in interfering with the affairs of two sovereign states. He went on to express his bewilderment around the guardedness of Finland and Sweden towards Russia. The objective of the Forum, Putin claimed, was to work proactively with international partners, including those of the West, to address environmental, economic, and societal issues and opportunities in the Arctic.  

Access to international markets and capital inform Russia’s bifurcated foreign policy: aggressive posturing on its Western front in Ukraine and a vision-based approach to Arctic development in the North. In this interpretation, the IAF is a form of reputation laundering, a term usually used to describe the ways in which beneficiaries of kleptocratic regimes “recast themselves as global citizens in good standing in Western societies.”The IAF adopts an ostensibly progressive agenda centered on the protection of indigenous rights, environmental sustainability, and internationalism. Through its collaboration with another Roscongress entity, the Eurasian Women’s Forum, the IAF also engaged a panel focusing on the organization’s work in fostering a new generation of women leaders. 

Civilian and military functions tend to overlap in Russia’s Arctic strategy with military exigencies informed by economic priorities. According to Swedish defense analyst Jonas Kjellén, Russia’s military buildup in the region, particularly around the Kola peninsula, is closely tied to its protection of entry/exit points to the Northern Sea Route (NSR). In his address, Putin discussed the central priority of connecting the NSR to inland transportation and creating a new model of soliciting foreign investment for developing the NSR, working with states of  Southeast Asia, India, and the Persian Gulf. Three of the four business priority areas of the Forum addressed issues specific to the NSR— “Competing on the Global Stage”, “A Magnet for Investment”, and “Developing Key Settlements.”  

Russia’s military approach to the Arctic seems ancillary to its economic interests in the region. Access to international markets and capital are central to a bifurcated Russian policy: aggressive posturing on its Western front in Ukraine and a vision-based approach to Arctic development in the North. The IAF is consistent with this grand strategy, seeking to promote a vision of Russian foreign policy in the Arctic divorced from its ongoing war in Ukraine.