Event Report NATO at a Crossroads: Present Challenges and Future Trajectories
Prepared by Anna Robinson
Event Details
The event NATO at a Crossroads: Present Challenges and Future Trajectories was held on Friday November 7 to examine various challenges and demands NATO is currently facing due to an increasingly multipolar and conflictual world. The emergence of new hostile actors, hybrid threats, and attacks on the neoliberal order places an additional need for NATO to be adaptive and resilient.
As an influential member in NATO, Canada’s defence strategy is taking a noteworthy shift in light of a rapidly changing international environment. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s budget – referred to as Canada Strong – plans to invest an estimated $81.8 billion in defence, aimed at strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) while reaffirming its role in multinational organizations and NATO exercises. With this rapidly evolving domestic and international contexts in mind, EETN’s conference brought together an array of academics and political practitioners to discuss ongoing developments with the Alliance, its current status, as well as critical next steps to ensure a stable future.
Panel One: Academic Institutions
Our first panel convened scholars and researchers from diverse disciplinary backgrounds to reflect on NATO’s future, as well as the evolving landscape of Canadian defence and security. Speakers addressed persistent gaps in Canada’s defence posturing; they went on to highlight the need for more transparency and open communication with the public on national security priorities. They also examined how external actors– including the United States (US) and key European Allies – shape NATO’s strategic direction and, in turn, Canada’s position within the Alliance.
Speaker One: Dr. Christian Leuprecht (Professor, Royal Military College and Queen’s University)
Dr. Leuprecht’s presentation looked at the grand strategy of the US to reflect on how this has influenced NATO to previously change its approaches to global security, as well as how Canada should organize its own strategy. Dr. Leuprecht remarked on how despite the current unreliability of the US Administration, we should not be excessively concerned for the future of the Alliance. He highlighted that the grand strategy of the US has shifted historically and unpredictably since 2000. In 2007, its pivot towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific reflected a similar systemic shift; this being said, its land mission in Europe remains a priority requiring continued collaboration.
While the US may not be able to support Europe in the same way it has historically as a result of ongoing domestic economic struggles, it will remain essential for additional actors to supplant resources to boost European defence. Dr. Leuprecht identified that a major issue for Canada continues to be its lack of engagement and depth to its international partnerships. For example, Canada continues to struggle to establish deep and effective ties with the European Parliament. Dr. Leuprecht advised that it is a necessity for Canada to partner with fellow middle powers to reaffirm its international role and relevance. This includes countries in the Black Sea region, as well as the Weimar triangle – regions that remain critical threat vectors in the war with Russia and integral to maintaining peace in Europe. Therefore, Canada should look to give more to these partners and deepen bonds. When it comes to increasing defence spending, he states we need to clearly identify what we need to buy, how it is bought, and how it is paid for.
Additionally, considering when to focus on defence investment versus procurement remains a critical question. Overall, if Canada hopes to improve its ability to support its partners as well as cement its role in the international order, such domestic considerations, external pressures, and ongoing shifts need to be made transparent and clear.
Speaker Two: Dr. Benjamin Zyla (Professor, University of Ottawa)
Dr. Zyla’s presentation focused on four key themes: ongoing debates surrounding how much defence spending is “enough”; the diminishing coherence and contested meaning of “the West”; the importance of avoiding excessive pessimism when assessing global security trends; and the effects of no living memory of great war in Canada. On the question of minimum spending, Dr. Zyla noted this was a question of reduced importance; instead, policymakers need to identify where the maximum lies, what the money is spent on, and how this balances against sectors being cut. Money allocated to defence often does not get completely spent in a fiscal year, raising questions about internal logistics. Additionally, the grand story of why Canada needs additional defence spending is missing, making it difficult to convince the public that such spending is necessary. This disconnect can cause further friction between citizens and the government.
In response to the decline and diminished coherence of the West – a trend targeted and exploited by Russian actors – Dr. Zyla noted how much of this decline comes from within. The erosion of democratic norms within the transatlantic community, he highlights, has contributed to such a decline in status, enabling interference and external attacks by foreign actors. The solution to this normative decline must come from within the transatlantic community itself, and more importantly, it is vital Canadians remain optimistic. The current international system provides many opportunities for middle powers to work together, including in instances of mediation, niche diplomacy, and multilateral cooperation.
Finally, Dr. Zyla suggested that Canadian decision-makers must contend with the fact that the current generation has no living memory of great war. This has a significant impact on the ways threats are framed in society, the way civil society perceives such frames, as well as the government’s ability to respond through defence spending. A major takeaway from his presentation is that improving Canada’s defence is not about obvious concrete actions, but the subtler ones which work to legitimate and support Canada’s national and international ambitions.
Speaker Three: Dr. Anne Fitz-Gerald (Professor and Director of Balsillie School of International Affairs)
Dr. Fitz-Gerald focused her presentation on the importance of considering data and technology in future defence planning. She suggests these dimensions of war have changed in recent years, requiring new approaches to address cognitive and data-driven tactics. Power has become increasingly vested in who owns the most intellectual property (IP) and who controls data, having ramifications for a nation’s sovereignty.
Dr. Fitz-Gerald suggests this new technological environment continues to be a major weak point for Canada, who has not built up the skills, products, and resources to excel in this industry. Civil and government workers do not have the tools to navigate this intangible world, both in policy and in threat responses. Decisions on deployment and sunsetting of legacy systems, along with innovation towards future ones, will have to be made. She presents Canada as an excellent candidate to become a specialist within this new context if the appropriate steps are taken.
A key component to this strategy is the Arctic, as reflected in Carney’s budget, which has the ideal environmental conditions to store, process, and receive data. Developing data centers in northern climates would also provide Canada with a stake in setting the rules of the technological game. Canada can use this to advocate for safe and responsible use of technology, reinforcing liberal values. Canada requires value-added products and services to prosper, which would create a technical specialist role, create passive income through IP, and create opportunities for collaboration with international partners. Otherwise, Canada may continue to face a drain on talent and patents, remaining ill-equipped to handle the new emerging frontiers of security.
Speaker Four: Dr. Luca Ratti (Professor, University of Rome III)
Dr. Ratti outlined the various historical crossroads that NATO has faced and advocated for its ability to resurrect itself. NATO’s history of adaptation makes it well-equipped to be able to handle various challenges and structural changes, suggesting that there should be a more positive outlook on the future of the Alliance. He noted how the crossroads today look different than before; there will certainly be setbacks, but the need to pivot is not a new experience.
Dr. Ratti went on to outline four major dynamics for the current resurrection of NATO: the revival of American leadership; the need for Europe to back up its defence promises with concrete action; the consolidation of the Nordic and Eastern flanks; and the consolidation of NATO’s values. The first two points both create an opportunity for transformation within European members, where countries can begin to strengthen their commitments and capabilities. This will create a stronger NATO, and in doing so, a stronger Europe. The final two points emphasize the need for geographic and ideological consolidation; the two newest members, Sweden and Finland, demonstrate good progress in consolidating flanks closest to Russia, leaving hope for the future. Finally, the neoliberal values of NATO need to be reaffirmed and fully committed too. The fractures between neoliberalism versus more traditional conservative ideologies have caused internal conflict, polarization, and an overall lack of cohesion, leaving NATO vulnerable.
Speaker Five: Dr. David Sichinava (Adjunct Research Professor, Carleton University)
Dr. Sichinava presented the results of his survey research conducted in Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, and Georgia. The goal of the study was to track the perception of public and security issues in the Baltics and South Caucasus. Conducted via interviews, the result provided interesting information regarding perceived threats, sentiments regarding allies, as well as challenges perceived by citizens. His study measured many different questions, however a few key ones stood out.
Regarding the perception of the biggest threat to their country, publics in Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia all ranked Russia as the first; Armenia ranked Azerbaijan as its leading concern. Political instability was the second biggest threat to all. The impact of actors like Russia, China, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) were mixed, but generally skewed negatively (especially in Baltic states). Alternatively, Western organizations were seen more positively, though with mixed answers in the South Caucasus. Publics in the Baltics voiced strong support for the West, stating they believed the West would come to their aid in the case of an attack. Other countries however, still charged themselves with their own protection and survival. The impact of Canada was seen positively in the Baltics and inconclusive elsewhere.
Important conclusions drawn from the study include notes reflecting on the positive perceptions towards NATO and the European Union (EU) continuing to be common, even in the South Caucasus, where much uncertainty and distrust remains. This means there is still space for organizations that promote neoliberal values to connect with the population and mitigate autocratic influence. Additionally, in the South Caucasus, an area especially vulnerable to malign influence, there is a strong awareness and readiness to mobilize against threatening actors.
Speaker Six: Dr. Mihai Sebe (Lecturer, University of Bucharest and Head of the European Affairs Department; European Institute of Romania)
The final speaker of the panel discussed the importance of the Black Sea in the shifting geopolitical context, advocating for NATO to pay more attention to this region. The Black Sea region (BSR) is both a critical target for Russian threats, and a vital part of international trade with Europe. Dr. Sebe suggested that Romania as an important emerging actor in this region, highlighting its strategic geography and ongoing security initiatives. Critical to Romania’s strategy to defend the Black Sea is the Danube River, an important trade route that connects to the Balkans and beyond, which Dr. Sebe argued must be better utilized.
Looking to the future, the rebuilding of Ukraine will involve these trade routes, further underscoring its importance. Productive involvement from the BSR necessitates better and deeper cooperation with Türkiye, an area of opportunity.
A key part of Russia’s actions in the BSR is the development of hybrid tactics, which NATO needs to improve its responses to. Dr. Sebe pointed to the increasing automation of warfare, which has several important security implications, including the need for improved general regulation of technology, especially in domains of artificial intelligence (AI). In conclusion, the Eastern flank and BSR continue to experience rapid developments; NATO must be prepared to support and respond to these challenges.
Panel Two: Policymakers and Practitioners
Our second panel brought together four practitioners from the fields of defence, foreign policy, and diplomacy. Their discussions largely concentrated on the concrete steps already being taken to bolster NATO’s defence capabilities, as well as the strategic initiatives shaping the Alliance’s future trajectory.
Speaker One: H.E. Witold Dzielski (Ambassador, Embassy of Poland)
Witold Dzielski, Abassador to the Embassy of Poland, took the time to discuss the commitments that Poland has made towards NATO spending, bolstering the Eastern flank, as well as improvements that can be made to the strategic defence of Europe. As one of the top spenders in NATO, Poland has invested a greal deal in procurement, providing a robust defence framework. Dzielski also highlighted the extensive defence partnership that exist between Poland and Canada. The two have a long history of joint military cooperation and training bilaterally, as well as through NATO exercises. He noted how Canada recognizes the significant contributions of Poland in supporting Ukrainian refugees at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, as well as Ukrainian resilience and defence capabilities overall. For Canada, deepening its ties with Poland is an important strategic move. This is reflected through the recent announcement from Prime Minister Mark Carney and Prime Minister Donald Tusk that they will continue to enhance interoperability and collaboration. This will be an important move in reaffirming Canadian partnerships to cement its role in defending European security.
Speaker Two: Eric Laporte (Executive Director, Defence and Security Relations Division, Global Affairs)
Eric Laporte focused on discussing how the framework of decision-making and strategy-setting have changed. He suggests that we are witnessing a reversion back to “classical” geopolitical norms and dynamics, in which power politics, balancing behaviour, and strategic interdependence are growing increasing important, accompanied by renewed concerns over absolute gains. There is also a renewed focus on deterrence as countries seek to contain various malign actors.
For Canada, key questions on sovereignty have emerged: what is sovereign capability? And what does it look like in a Canadian context? Important to agenda-setting will be determining what Canada needs in order to reinforce its independent capabilities, and how this will be acquired. Laporte also emphasized that the way hard power is implemented has changed, influencing the direction of spending.
Laporte ended with a reflection on how NATO is being enhanced through transformation, as the Alliance adapts itself to respond to a new reality. He outlines some key developments from Canada that should boost innovation in defence technology. First, a new climate change centre in Quebec that addresses the unique security risks that are emerging as a result of climate change; and second, the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) has opened its North American Regional Office in Halifax, Nova Scotia. These recent events indicate important ways that Canada is contributing to NATO’s ongoing transformation.
Speaker Three: Kerry-Lynn Nankivell (Director, NATO and Europe, ADM(Pol) Department of National Defence)
Nankivell discussed the importance of policy alignment between Canada, NATO, the Department of National Defence (DND), and Global Affairs Canada (GAC). She identified a high level of alignment with NATO through the replication of key bureaucratic structures in Canada’s defence policymaking. She also emphasized that DND and GAC work closely together to ensure objectives and procedures are closely aligned, creating a robust policy framework for Canada. Canada is responding to not only Russia, but also the threat of Russia with others. This creates a need for a comprehensive defence plan between Canada and others in the international community.
Nankivell identified several challenges that need to be resolved, including responsible spending, which is an area of increasing concern and responsibility. She also identifies challenges around innovation and increasing the amount of available personnel for the CAF. She generally had a positive assessment towards the steps that Canada is making, and will be making, to ensure it establishes a productive role on the global stage.
Speaker Four: BGen Scott McKenzie (Director General, Canadian Joint Operations Command)
Scott McKenzie provided a presentation as a security practitioner on Canada’s ability to support NATO readiness. Canadian presence in Latvia has been a key part of this support, which has brought lessons and growth. The importance of pre-positioning was emphasized, where Canada participates in collective actions so that it can mobilize as fast as possible if a real threat occurs. Canada is increasingly participating in decision-making, rehearsals, plans, and drills which contributes to its role in NATO.
Since 2022, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has been rapidly evolving and mobilizing, which Canada must ensure it keeps up with. McKenzie establishes that the fundamental problem facing NATO in regards to European security is its ability to demonstrate a sustained capacity to combat Russian threats over a long duration. The key to warding off Russia will be to demonstrate strength, which requires intense amounts of consolidation and cooperation. Consolidation remains an integral problem, as NATO countries still struggle to integrate forces on tactical and strategic levels. Countries also need to work on standardizing systems and equipment between each other to improve interoperability. Infrastructure also needs to be improved (ports, hospitals, borders, etc.) to enable rapid mobilization. This requires cooperation between militaries, governments, and private industries. Therefore, McKenzie advocates that overcoming logistical problems such as these are key to improving the effectiveness and success of NATO forces.