Has Moldova Evaded Russian Interference?

The Moldovan electorate has once again stood up to Russia and reaffirmed their path towards the European Union. On September 28, 2025, Moldovan citizens went to the polls to vote in this year’s parliamentary election, the results of which were approved by the Central Electoral Commission on October 5, whose report is now before the Constitutional Court.

Since applying for and receiving EU candidate status in the immediate aftermath of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Moldovan government has abandoned its previous balancing strategy between Russia and the EU and pivoted entirely toward Europe. Now, under threat of increased Russian interference and manipulation, Moldovans have voted to continue on their path towards accession to the EU in a contentious election cycle targeted with hybrid warfare. While the pro-European Part of Action and Solidarity (PAS) will remain in power, Moldova’s future membership in the EU is not yet solidified.

What happened?

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections were framed as another decision point on the country’s road to joining the EU, occurring just one year after 2024’s presidential elections and referendum on updating the Constitution to permit accession, passing only by a narrow margin. While multiple entities competed for votes, the two main players in this cycle are the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and the Russia-aligned Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP), formed by the parties of Communists, Party of Socialists, and the Heart and Future of Moldova. The Heart of Moldova, along with Moldova Mare, were ultimately barred from participating in the election due to suspected campaign financing. Russian interference was widely anticipated and documented leading up to the election, points underscored by President Maia Sandu in an address the week before the election, as she warned the electorate about security threats in Transnistria and Ukraine, as well as oligarchic capture.

Leading up to the election, observers expected a tighter race between the PAS and BEP. However, with 52.21 percent turnout, PAS scored a clear victory with over 50.2 percent of the overall vote and a mandated 55 out of 101 seats in Parliament. BEP achieved 26 seats, with the remaining 20 divided among three other parties whose share of the vote reached the required threshold. PAS will keep its definitive majority in the newly-formed government.

The outcome indicates some regional divides in the electorate. Disaggregating the domestic and diaspora votes shared by the Central Electoral Commission, PAS achieved 44.13 percent of the vote compared to BEP’s 28.29 (considering only votes placed within the country). Domestically, PAS outpaced BEP in the central raions. BEP put up a stronger fight in the north and south, though not enough to sweep the areas or make up for its relatively poorer performance. Unsurprisingly, the two regions with special status and widely considered to be pro-Russian strongholds, Gagauzia and Transnistria, voted overwhelmingly for BEP as anticipated (82.35 and 51.02 percent for BEP, respectively).

Moving to the diaspora vote, PAS votes outnumbered BEP in all but three of the 41 countries with polling stations abroad: Russia, Belarus, and Bulgaria. In 36 of those countries, PAS scored a majority with over 60 percent of the vote. Diaspora votes are clearly in favour of Moldova’s European path; as in last year’s constitutional referendum, the diaspora votes pushed the total over the 50 percent threshold towards further European integration and rejection of Russian control. All told, the votes tallied 50.20 percent of the overall vote for PAS and BEP in second place with 24.20 percent of the vote, securing the pro-Europeans their majority.

Was the election free and fair?

OSCE’s observation report concludes that the election was well-run and successfully administered, despite vote-buying, cyber attacks, and bomb threats. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, congratulated Moldova on its elections and reasserted European support. However, not all parties are satisfied with the administration of the election. In the days since the election, former president and leader of the Socialists Igor Dodon has decried the results as illegitimate on his Facebook page, claiming that PAS lost within the country (notably, PAS still beat Dodon’s bloc by 15 points considering only the domestic vote) and won a “dubious ‘victory’ due to the diaspora.” His comments echo those of Russian MFA spokesperson Maria Zakharova. Zakharova and Dodon refer to vote suppression at home and abroad, referencing the limited number of voting stations allocated to Russia and relocation of some polling stations for Transnistrian residents. Moldovan authorities claim that the reduced number of Russia-based polling stations is due to the credible security risk to the election. Likewise, Moldovan authorities claim polling stations for Transnistria are allocated in compliance with national legislation and demand. Given the consistent and concerted effort by Russia to interfere in Moldova’s elections, the explanation is convincing.

What’s next?

In the immediate, the domestic political context remains dynamic. The CEC’s report on the election is before the Constitutional Court, which will approve the results in the coming week. Since election day, PAS’s majority has dipped from 55 to 53 as two candidates on PAS’s list announced a plan to act in parliament as pro-Europe independents. BEP has protested outside of Parliament, and PAS has alleged that those protestors are paid. PAS’s pre-election day complaint about the George Simion-affiliated “Democracy at Home” Party’s suspect campaign financing and online activities has been volleyed from the CEC to the Constitutional Court to decide whether the party’s six mandated seats will be confirmed. The Heart of Moldova, excluded from the parliamentary elections, has been likewise barred from upcoming local elections.

In the longer term, the Moldovan government’s goal is to join the EU within the next 5 years. However, as Moldova makes progress in its growth plan and continues to meet targets for accession, major concerns of the EU still exist, including the precariousness of Transnistria and instability due to continued Russian interference. Additionally, provided Moldova remains on track in its progress towards membership and continues to resist Russian control, the EU itself needs to agree to Moldova’s accession, a vote which could be derailed by naysayers. While unanimous agreement is required, there have been discussions around the use of qualified majority voting to mitigate the risks posed by the EU’s more pugnacious members. Even if Moldova meets its end of the bargain, the EU can still deny membership.

While many breathed a sigh of relief on Monday morning at the result in favor of PAS, the outcome may also underscore the existing schism in the electorate and threats of foreign interference. For those who support Moldova’s future as a member of the EU, this is a good time for optimism but not complacency. Russia will continue its concerted attempts directly and indirectly to hold sway over Moldova’s future. Moldova’s continued sovereignty and independence rely on domestic commitment to its European path and support of the EU.