Strategic Autonomy and the Deepening Türkiye -Russia Relationship

Türkiye’s deepening relationship with Russia is reshaping the regional security landscape and challenging NATO’s strategic cohesion. From trilateral cooperation in Syria’s Astana Process to the controversial S-400 missile system and major energy projects like TurkStream and Akkuyu, Ankara’s pursuit of strategic autonomy continues to raise questions about alliance unity and energy dependency.

Strategic Cooperation in Syria: The Astana Process 

The Astana Process, initiated in 2017 by Iran, Russia, and Türkiye has played a pivotal role in managing the Syrian civil war, despite the trio’s divergent interests. While Russia and Iran have supported the Assad regime, Türkiye has backed various opposition groups. This collaboration, though fraught with complexities, has been instrumental in shaping the trajectory of the conflict.  

The Astana Process emerged as an alternative to the United Nations (UN)-led Geneva talks, aiming to reduce hostilities and establish de-escalation zones in Syria. Russia’s primary goal was to legitimize the Assad regime and consolidate its military gains. Iran sought to maintain its influence in Syria, ensuring continued accessibility to Hezbollah in Lebanon (Azizi, 2020). Conversely, Türkiye aimed to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region along its border with Syria, viewing the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as a terrorist threat due to their links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Center for Preventive Action, 2025; Grajewski, 2021) 

Türkiye’s trajectory within the Astana Process evolved from cautious mediation to a more assertive and strategic engagement aligned with its broader geopolitical aims. Initially entering the trilateral format with Russia and Iran to manage and prevent Kurdish political mobilization and violence near its southern border, Türkiye used the de-escalation zones not only to limit the YPG’s presence but  also to entrench its own long-term political influence in northern Syria (Guneylioglu, 2025). As the process unfolded, particularly from 2019 onward, Ankara shifted from mere observation and containment toward active operational involvement, increasingly backing the Syrian National Army (SNA), a conglomerate of rebel factions integrated under Turkish direction and logistical control (Zelin & Cagaptay, 2025). 

Türkiye’s maneuvering was shaped not only by tactical opportunity but by its evolving relationship with Russia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had successfully positioned his country as a regional power able to speak with all sides – hosting negotiations for grain export agreements with Ukraine and simultaneously maintaining a military presence in Syria. Russia tolerated Turkish advances in part because Ankara tacitly accepted the continuation of Russian air dominance in central and eastern Syria, even as Turkish-backed groups overran regime positions in the west (Yildiz, 2021). This quid-pro-quo understanding, never formalized but visible in military posturing and diplomatic language, underscored the highly transactional and realist basis of the Turkish-Russian relationship during this critical period (Coşkun et al., 2024). 

Despite the Astana Process playing a significant role in managing conflict dynamics on the ground in Syria, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remained highly skeptical of its long-term legitimacy and strategic outcomes, particularly in contrast to the UN-led Geneva process. NATO consistently reiterated that there was no military solution to the Syrian conflict and firmly supported a political resolution rooted in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (NATO, 2018). From NATO’s perspective, the Astana Process, while ostensibly designed to reduce hostilities through mechanisms like de-escalation zones, risked undermining international diplomatic consensus by becoming a parallel framework to the UN-backed solution. Indeed, many NATO members, particularly the US, expressed concern that the de-escalation zones facilitated regime consolidation rather than genuine conflict reduction, as they were often used as staging grounds for Syrian and Russian offensives (VOA News, 2018). These zones were criticized by international humanitarian organizations as being one-sided, failing to protect opposition-held areas from systematic recapture (International Rescue Committee, 2017). Throughout the war, NATO maintained its own strategic focus on counter-terrorism, particularly through its role in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (NATO, 2024). While Türkiye’s participation in the Astana Process aligned with its national security objectives, NATO as a whole viewed the framework as an inadequate and potentially harmful substitute for a legitimate, UN-endorsed political solution. 

The S-400 Missile System Acquisition 

Türkiye’s interest in advanced air defense systems dates back over a decade, with multiple attempts to procure such systems from NATO Allies, including the US. However, these efforts were often stymied by disagreements over technology transfer and co-production rights. The S-400 deal with Russia – concluded in 2019 –  offered more favourable terms in these areas, aligning with Türkiye’s desire to bolster its indigenous defense capabilities and reduce reliance on Western suppliers (Fraser, 2019). The system’s extended and flexible engagement, allowing for various missile types and sizes, and its rapid deployment capability further enhanced its appeal to the Turkish government (Ritzen, 2018). Moreover, the acquisition was seen as a means to assert national sovereignty and diversify Türkiye’s defense partnerships, especially in the wake of strained relations with the US following the 2016 coup attempt, which Ankara partially attributed to American complicity (Karako, 2019). 

A central issue raised by the US and other NATO Allies was the potential for the S-400’s advanced radar to collect intelligence on NATO military assets, including stealth platforms like the F-35 fighter jet, thereby risking the exposure of sensitive operational data to Russia. This was not just a strategic concern: integration of a Russian-made system into NATO’s defense network also posed unprecedented compatibility issues (Marcus, 2019). As a result, Türkiye’s participation in key joint military exercises and training activities was scaled back, weakening interoperability, a cornerstone of NATO’s collective defense model (Spindel, 2019). While the Alliance formally respects each member state’s sovereign right to determine its own defense procurement choices, the S-400 deal was widely seen as crossing a threshold that jeopardized collective security and trust. For NATO, sovereignty must be balanced with interdependence, particularly when it comes to shared systems and defense planning. 

Domestically, the S-400 acquisition bolstered President Erdoğan’s narrative of an assertive and independent Türkiye. The deal was portrayed as a triumph of national sovereignty, resonating with a populace increasingly skeptical of Western intentions. Additionally, the advanced capabilities of the S-400 system were perceived as a safeguard against potential internal threats, particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, during which Turkish F-16s were used by insurgent forces (Karako, 2019). 

Turkish-Russian Energy Partnerships 

The TurkStream pipeline, operational since January 2020, is a dual-line natural gas conduit that transports Russian gas across the Black Sea directly to Türkiye. With a total capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters annually, the first line supplies Türkiye’s domestic market, while the second extends through Bulgaria to Southeast and Central Europe. This infrastructure not only solidifies Türkiye’s role as a regional energy hub but also deepens its energy interdependence with Russia. 

Analysts highlight that while TurkStream enhances Türkiye’s strategic importance in regional energy transit, it simultaneously increases Ankara’s reliance on Russian energy imports. Given that nearly half of Türkiye’s natural gas is sourced from Russia, this project highlights a complex interdependence that can both empower and constrain Türkiye’s foreign policy options (Siccardi, 2024). 

The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, located in Mersin Province, represents Türkiye’s inaugural venture into nuclear energy. Constructed and operated by Russia’s state-owned Rosatom under a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model, the plant comprises four VVER-1200 reactors, each with a capacity of 1,200 MW  (World Nuclear News, 2024). This arrangement, wherein Rosatom retains ownership and operational control, is unprecedented and has sparked debates regarding Türkiye’s energy sovereignty (Bozkurt, 2025). 

Critics argue that the BOO model may lead to long-term dependency on Russian technology and expertise, potentially compromising Türkiye’s autonomy in critical energy infrastructure. Furthermore, the plant’s proximity to strategic NATO installations has raised security concerns amongst Türkiye’s Allies, emphasizing the geopolitical ramifications of such deep energy collaborations with Russia (Tol, 2024). 

NATO views Türkiye’s expanding energy relationship with Russia – particularly through projects such as the TurkStream pipeline and the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant – with growing concern. This position is consistent with the Alliance’s long-standing emphasis on energy security, diversification, and resilience against strategic vulnerabilities that stem from over-reliance on a single, adversarial supplier. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept explicitly identifies Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to Allied security, underscoring its use of energy as a tool of political coercion (NATO, 2022).  

Importantly, Türkiye is not alone in this predicament. Europe as a whole continues to grapple with significant exposure to Russian energy, often falling short of meeting NATO’s collective energy security goals. In 2024, Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports reached record levels, with major purchases by France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium—despite the broader geopolitical context (Niranjan, 2025). Pipeline gas from Russia still flows into Europe, though European Union officials have recently set out a plan to end this dependency by 2027 (Lamche, 2025). Furthermore, Russian petroleum products continue to enter the EU through exemption-based mechanisms for landlocked states like Hungary and Slovakia and through indirect channels via countries like India, China, and Türkiye, which refine Russian crude (Raghunandan & Katinas, 2025). On the nuclear front, Russia remains a dominant supplier of nuclear fuel and technology, controlling substantial global uranium enrichment capacity, with nearly 20% of Europe’s raw uranium imports still sourced from Russia (Hockenos, 2025). The web of dependencies created by such projects across all NATO members raises fundamental concerns about the Alliance’s cohesion and the integrity of its collective defense posture in the face of sustained Russian influence. 

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