Iran-Europe Relations: The Impact of Raisi’s Presidency on Nuclear Negotiations and Diplomatic Tensions

During his time as Iran’s President from 2021–2024, Seyed Ebrahim Raisi spearheaded a marked recalibration of Iran’s foreign policy characterized by heightened distrust and skepticism toward Europe and its efforts to play a central diplomatic role in resolving current United States (US)-Iran tensions. Diverging from the positions of the previous Rouhani presidency, Raisi’s administration viewed Europe less as an independent geopolitical actor and more as an extension of a declining US-dominated international order.  

As a result, Raisi demonstrated little willingness to engage with European powers, consistently voicing skepticism regarding their intentions and portraying them as strategically subordinate to the US (Vinjamuri et al., 2025). Reflecting this shift in tone, Raisi’s addresses to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2024 repeatedly underscored the perceived decline of US hegemony, declaring that the “project to Americanize the world has failed” and that the “old liberal order … has been pushed aside”  (Jamshidi, 2022). During this speech, he urged European states to distance themselves from US expansionist policies and to honour their commitments to Iran, warning that “US unilateralism is not in the interest of anyone.” Although Raisi expressed conditional interest in economic cooperation with Europe, he simultaneously cautioned against what he termed as “alien” interference in shaping these relations (News University ANA, 2025). 

Differences Between Raisi and Rouhani Administrations Regarding Relations with Europe

A key distinction between Raisi’s administration and that of Rouhani was the former’s renewed emphasis on strengthening the “resistance economy” in Iran. Originally introduced by Ayatollah Khamenei but largely sidelined during Rouhani’s tenure, this strategy aimed to achieve economic self-sufficiency and neutralize the impact of foreign sanctions. Under Raisi, this strategy translated into a more deliberate policy of boosting domestic production, expanding non-oil exports, and reducing reliance on imports (Tasnim News, 2019). This focus marked a clear departure from Rouhani’s approach, which prioritized diplomacy with the West as the primary way to reduce economic isolation and improve Iran’s security. Contrarily, by publicly decoupling Iran’s economic trajectory from the success of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Raisi’s administration sought to minimize perceived external leverage over its nuclear program. This posture allowed Iran to maintain a firm stance on its demands despite European pressure, as the immediate economic necessity for a deal was downplayed domestically (Mashregh News, 2022a). Though this strategy hardened Iran’s negotiating position, it also contributed to the prolonged nature of negotiations by diminishing the perceived urgency for Iran to make a compromise (Mashregh News, 2025). 

In parallel, the long-standing “Look East” policy, championed by Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, has gained unprecedented momentum during Raisi’s presidency. This doctrine was based on the belief that the current US-led international system would lose influence to an emerging global order centred around Asia. Raisi’s administrated followed this policy by strengthening Iran’s ties with its Eastern partners, particularly China and Russia, as a means to counter the diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed by the US and Europe (Mashregh News, 2025; Velayati, 2022). This strategic pivot further limited prospects for cooperation with Europe, as Tehran increasingly perceived Europe and the US as being aligned, thus leading Iran to prioritize partnerships with Asian powers over engagement with the West (Mashregh News, 2025; Velayati, 2022). 

During this time, Iranian official discourse on nuclear negotiations with Europe also adopted a much more firm and critical tone. For example, Raisi openly condemned the US and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) for what he described as a “very improper” act of advancing a resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors that was sharply critical of Iran while all sides were still engaged in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program (Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) English, 2022). Raisi also questioned the reliability of US and European negotiators, stressing that Iran would not allow negotiations to be for negotiations’ sake and insisting that any dialogue must be results-oriented and produce tangible outcomes for Iran (Akbari, 2021; Tasnim News, 2025). Central to this administration’s stance was the categorical rejection of expanding the scope of negotiations, particularly through Raisi’s assertion that – despite being a core concern for Europe – Iran’s ballistic missile program was non-negotiable (Akbari, 2021; Institute for Peace and Diplomacy (IPD) Middle East Research Team, 2021). 

Late 2021: Initial Stalemates in EU-Iran Nuclear Negotiations

The Raisi administration’s approach to negotiating  its nuclear program with Europe began with the seventh round of the ‘Vienna talks’ in November 2021. Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and Iran’s chief negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani consistently emphasized two central demands during these talks: one, the complete and verifiable lifting of all sanctions imposed after the US withdrawal in 2018; and two, legally binding guarantees to prevent any future US administration from abandoning the agreement (IRNA, 2021). Additionally, Iran’s negotiating team sought assurances that sanctions relief would result in tangible and sustainable economic benefits for their country (IRNA, 2021). These demands were proposed to mitigate against the negative effects of the first JCPOA, where the absence of such guarantees led to significant economic disruption for Iran after the US’ unilateral exit in 2018. During the Vienna talks, Iran submitted two documents outlining proposals on sanctions removal and nuclear commitments, with a third document on guarantees and verification that they were abiding by the JCPOA. In presenting these proposals, Bagheri Kani asserted that Iran’s position during these talks was based on principles accepted by all parties, despite European dissatisfaction (Ahqaqi, 2021). 

European partners, particularly the E3, reiterated their commitment to reviving the JCPOA, viewing it as the most effective means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, they also expressed mounting concerns over Iran’s accelerated nuclear activities (E3, 2022). According to IAEA reports, these advancements undermined the non-proliferation benefits of the original deal and sharply reduced Iran’s breakout time to produce weapons-grade uranium (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Shortly after Raisi assumed office in August 2021, Iran began enriching uranium to 60% while also producing uranium metal. By the start of the November 2021 Vienna talks, Iran had accumulated 113.8 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium. Enriching to 20% completes almost all the necessary work to produce the fissile material for a bomb (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023), a threshold Iran surpassed with its 113.8 kilogram stockpile. While European officials acknowledged Iran’s concerns regarding sanctions relief, they viewed the demand for legally binding guarantees as particularly difficult to fulfill, especially in the context of Iran’s renewed effort to enrich its uranium (Arms Control Association, 2022). 

2022 to Early 2023: Escalation of Tensions and Diplomatic Impasse

From 2022 to early 2023, the diplomatic climate surrounding the European Union (EU)-Iran nuclear talks deteriorated sharply; this breakdown was caused by two major events.  

The first was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Before the invasion, Russia had played a relatively constructive role in Iran–IAEA relations. While occasionally criticizing Iran for its breaches of the nuclear accord and delays in the JCPOA negotiations, Russia largely positioned itself as a mediator between Iran and the West. However, the full-scale invasion and resulting war between Russia and Ukraine fundamentally altered this dynamic, introducing significant challenges for the already faltering nuclear negotiations between Iran and European powers (Notte, 2023). 

Iran’s response to the war has gone beyond mere rhetorical support for Russia. Tehran has provided significant military assistance to Moscow, particularly in the form of loitering munitions such as the Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 drones, which have been widely used by Russian forces on the battlefield Ukrainian conflict (Kunertova, 2023). In October 2022, reports emerged suggesting that Iran was also preparing to supply Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, thus deepening its involvement in the conflict (Avdaliani, 2024). Iranian officials, including Amirabdollahian, defended providing Russia with these weapons and asserted that the drones did not violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This Resolution, which was adopted to lift sanctions on Iran as part of the JCPOA, regulates the transfer of goods that could potentially contribute to nuclear weapon delivery systems (Javan Online, 2022). Iran’s ambassador to the UN further supported this stance, arguing that these military transfers were outside the scope of the Resolution (Mashregh News, 2022b). 

The geopolitical shift triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine had a direct impact on the stalled JCPOA negotiations. As Russia grew increasingly dependent on Iran for both economic and military support, Moscow’s leverage over Tehran in the nuclear talks diminished (Notte, 2022). This new dependence reduced Russia’s ability – and, perhaps more critically, its willingness – to mediate the nuclear discussions effectively. As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia’s stance on Iran’s nuclear ambitions has become more tolerant. In fact, Moscow now appears to view Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities as beneficial to its own strategic interests. From Russia’s perspective, a broader confrontation between Iran and the West could serve to further complicate the West’s foreign policy focus, creating additional pressure on the liberal international order at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions (Notte, 2022; Notte, 2023). 

This shift in Russia’s approach, transforming from a constructive mediator to a more disengaged partner, has further undermined European efforts to revive the nuclear deal. For European nations, Iran’s military assistance to Russia has become a significant point of contention. The EU swiftly condemned Iran’s actions to provide Russia with military drones and missiles to use in the war. In response, the E3 and other European countries imposed new rounds of sanctions targeting Iranian officials and entities for human rights abuses and military cooperation – sanctions that were separate from those tied to Iran’s nuclear program (Court et al., 2024). Tehran quickly retaliated by sanctioning European individuals and organizations, accusing them of inciting unrest and meddling in its sovereign affairs (Fars News Agency, 2023). This cycle of punitive measures and countersanctions has further eroded trust and severely disrupted communication channels between the two sides. The introduction of these new, non-nuclear sanctions, coupled with Iran’s reciprocal measures, signaled a broader breakdown in bilateral relations, making it increasingly difficult to compartmentalize the nuclear negotiations from other contentious issues. 

The second factor contributing to the breakdown of the EU-Iran relationship during this period was the death of Masha Amini in September 2022 and the resulting political unrest in Iran. Amini died in police custody after being arrested for improperly wearing her hijab. The Iranian government’s handling of the protests criticizing the government drew strong condemnation and sanctions from European nations which, in turn, affected the prospects for the nuclear program negotiations. European governments, now reconsidering their approach to Iran, became increasingly hesitant to advance a deal with Tehran under its conservative conditions. Amirabdollahian also repeatedly denounced European statements and actions regarding the protests, accusing them of interference in Iran’s internal affairs and acting on a double standard (IRNA, 2022). This highly charged political environment further complicated any possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough on the nuclear issue, as European policy toward Iran began to increasingly incorporate conditions tied to domestic human rights concerns (Deutsche Welle, 2022; Lynch, 2022).

Conclusion

As the Raisi administration ended in May 2024, Iran-Europe relations were left strained, and the nuclear negotiations remained at a standstill. Despite existing communication channels aimed at preventing a complete diplomatic breakdown, trust further dissolved as the talks became increasingly entangled with broader disputes over Iran’s human rights record and its military support for Russia. European frustration deepened as Iran’s nuclear program advanced through higher enrichment levels and expanded centrifuge capacity, pushing the revival of the JCPOA further out of reach and prompting consideration of alternative strategies. As a result, Raisi’s legacy has been defined by an unyielding approach that emphasized resilience and national demands over compromise. This stance, while projecting Iran as a powerful and resilient actor, nevertheless prolonging the deadlock as well as Iran’s economic and political isolation. Raisi’s successor, Masoud Pezeshkian, now has to navigate balancing Iran’s emboldened nuclear program with his political ambitions to return to a more open and constructive relationship with Europe (Donya-e-Eqtesad, 2024). 

References

Ahqaqi, A. (2021). Mohamtaren chālesh-e dowr-e haftom-e mozākerāt-e Vīn chīst? [What is the most important challenge of the “seventh round” of Vienna talks?]. ISNA. https://www.isna.ir/news/1400081712678/%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%DA%86%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%86-%DA%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA 

Akbari, R. H. (2021). Raisi, the Presidency and Iran’s foreign policy. United States Institute of Peace. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/oct/04/raisi-presidency-and-irans-foreign-policy 

Arms Control Association. (2022). Restoring the JCPOA’s nuclear limits. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/restoring-jcpoas-nuclear-limits 

Avdaliani, E. (2024). Iran and Russia enter a new level of military cooperation. Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2024/iran-and-russia-enter-a-new-level-of-military-cooperation/ 

Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). How do countries create nuclear weapons? https://education.cfr.org/learn/reading/how-do-countries-create-nuclear-weapons 

Court, J. K., Contini, K. E., Stauber, A. M., Llewellyn, A. A. W. C., Clark, M. G., & Wood, J. E. (2024, February 28). US, UK and EU announce new measures against Iran and Russia. Sanctions News. https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-uk-and-eu-announce-new-measures-against-iran-and-russia/ 

Deutsche Welle. (2022). EU agrees to sanction Iran over protests crackdown. https://www.dw.com/en/eu-agrees-to-sanction-iran-over-response-to-jina-mahsa-amini-protests/a-63420000 

Donya-e-Eqtesad. (2024). Ta’neh-ye bī-vaqfe-ye Jalilī be Pezeshkiān/ Pezeshkiān: Barnāme-rīzī-ye āmerāne rā qabūl nadāram/Gozaresh-e dovvomīn monāzere-ye entekhābāt-e riyāsat-e jomhūrī [Jalili’s incessant taunts to Pezeshkian/ Pezeshkian: I do not accept authoritarian planning/Report on the second presidential election debate]. https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-62/4083073-%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85-%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B8%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C 

E3. (2022). Iran’s nuclear commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: E3 statement, November 2022. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-on-the-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-november-2022 

Fars News Agency. (2023). Kanaani dar vākonesh be tahrīmhā-ye Orupā va Engelis: Haqq-e khod rā barā-ye pāsokh mahfūz mi-dārim [Kanaani in response to European and British sanctions: We reserve our right to respond]. https://farsnews.ir/ForeignPolicy_World/1679410422000957108/%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%BE%D8%A7-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3:-%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AE-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B8-%D9%85%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85 

IPD Middle East Research Team. (2021). Foreign Policy Brief: Ebrahim Raisi’s foreign policy views. Peace and Diplomacy. https://peacediplomacy.org/2021/06/23/foreign-policy-brief-ebrahim-raisis-foreign-policy-views/ 

IRNA. (2021). Amīr-Abdullāhiyān: Hadaf-e moshārakat-e Īrān dar mozākerāt-e laghv-e tahrīmhā ast [Amirabdollahian: Iran’s goal in sanctions lifting negotiations is participation]. https://www.irna.ir/news/84546997/%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%BA%D9%88-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA 

IRNA. (2022). Amīr-Abdullāhiyān: Modākhele-ye keshvarhā-ye gharbī dar omūr-e dākhelī-ye Īrān rā mahkūm [Amirabdollahian condemns Western countries’ interference in Iran’s internal affairs]. IRNA. https://www.irna.ir/news/84898379/%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%88%D9%85 

IRNA English. (2022). Pres. Raisi tells nation: Improper act by US, E3 to submit IAEA resolution. https://en.irna.ir/news/84801730/Pres-Raisi-tells-nation-Improper-act-by-US-E3-to-submit-IAEA 

Jamshidi, A. (2022). Matn-e kāmel-e sokhanrānī-ye Ebrāhīm Ra’īsī dar Majma‘-e ‘Umūmī-ye Sāzmān-e Mellal [Full text of Ebrahim Raisi’s speech at the UN General Assembly]. Khordad News. https://www.khordad.news/fa/news/377836/متن-کامل-سخنرانی-ابراهیم-رئیسی-در-مجمع-عمومی-سازمان-ملل 

Javan Online. (2022). Tehrān: Pahpādhā-ye Īrān rabt-i be qat’nāme-ye 2231 nadārad [Tehran: Iran’s drones have nothing to do with Resolution 2231]. https://www.javanonline.ir/004f1c 

Kunertova, D. (2023). Drones have boots: Learning from Russia’s war in Ukraine. Contemporary Security Policy, 44(4), 576–591. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2262792 

Lynch, S. (2022). EU set to hit Iran with sanctions over protest crackdown. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-to-hit-iran-with-sanctions-over-protest-crackdown-death-mahsa-amini-iranian-women/ 

Mashregh News. (2022). Agar be eqtesād-e mogāvamati tavajjoh mī-shod, moshkelāt-e emrūz rā nadāshtīm [If attention had been given to a resistance-based economy, we wouldn’t have today’s problems]. https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1320210/اگر-به-اقتصاد-مقاومتی-توجه-می‌شد-مشکلات-امروز-را-نداشتیم 

Mashregh News. (2022). Pahpād-e Īrānī dar jang-e Ūkrāīn; senāryūyī ke īn rūzhā dar hāl-e pokht va paz-e ān hastand [Iranian drone in the Ukraine war; A scenario that is being cooked these days]. https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1431397/%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%A7%D9%88%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%88%DB%8C%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%BE%D8%AE%D8%AA 

Mashregh News. (2025). Tafāvot-hā-ye mozākerāt dar dowlat-e Ra’īsī bā dowlat-e pīshīn chīst? [What are the differences in negotiations under Raisi’s government compared to the previous one?]. https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1339195/تفاوت-های-مذاکرات-در-دولت-رئیسی-با-دولت-پیشین-چیست 

News University ANA. (2025). Raʾīsī: Āmrīkā va Orūpāī-hā dar qebāl-e Īrān giriftār-e eshtebāh-e mohāsabātī hastand [Raisi: The U.S. and Europeans are making a miscalculation regarding Iran]. ANA News Agency. https://ana.ir/fa/news/667658/رئیسی-آمریکا-اروپایی‌ها-در-قبال-ایران-گرفتار-اشتباه-محاسباتی-هستند 

Notte, H. (2022). Don’t expect any more Russian help on the Iran nuclear deal. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/dont-expect-any-more-russian-help-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal/ 

Notte, H. (2023). The Iran nuclear price tag. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/international/20083.pdf 

Tasnim News. (2019). Gozāresh-e tahlīlī-ye Tasnīm- Āqā-ye Ra’īs-e Jomhūr! Magar gozāshtīd eqtesād abzār-e qodrat bāshad? [Tasnim’s analytical report – Mr. President! Did you allow the economy to be a tool of power?] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/06/06/2084073/%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A2%D9%82%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%DA%AF%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF 

Tasnim News. (2025). Cherā mozākerāt-e haste-ī dar dowlat-e Shahīd-e Raʾīsī be natije na-rasīd? [Why did the nuclear negotiations not reach a conclusion during the administration of martyr Raisi?]. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/04/3321170/%DA%86%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF 

Velayati, A. A. (2022). Irān, Rūsiyah va Chīn; seh qudrat-e mohem va mostaqel dar moghābel-e towse‘aṭalabi-ye Āmrikā va Gharb [Iran, Russia, and China: Three important and independent powers against the expansionism of the U.S. and the West] (Dialogue). Khamenei.ir. https://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-dialog?id=50652 

Vinjamuri, L., Aydın-Düzgit, S., Bajpaee, C., Cooley, A., de Hoop Scheffer, A., Emmers, R., Fravel, M. T., Lind, J., Nasr, V., Quencez, M., Stelzenmüller, C., Della Costa Stuenkel, O., Vakil, S., & Zarakol, A. (2025). Competing visions of international order: Responses to US power in a fracturing world. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/2025-03-27-competing-visions-international-order-vinjamuri-et-al.pdf