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Turkish Foreign Policy in the BSR: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada

By Anna Robinson

Policy Recommendations

Türkiye’s Foreign Policy post 2022

Türkiye has historically played an influential role in the Black Sea Region (BSR) as NATO’s southeastern bulwark. The Montreux Convention gives Türkiye control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the key entry point of the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the BSR has been under wartime conditions. Türkiye has since invoked the Convention to effectively close the straits to both NATO and Russian ships; a decision which has nonetheless sparked controversy, particularly after Türkiye allowed Russian warships to travel through the straits if returning to a home port. Ankara remains apprehensive towards NATO involvement in the region, and while its relationship with the West is strained, it continues to maintain relations with Russia based on shared security, economic, and political interests in the BSR.

Türkiye, unlike most NATO countries, has not yet sanctioned Russia, and still remains one of Russia’s most important partners for refining Russian crude oil. At the same time, Türkiye has also provided diplomatic and military aid to Ukraine. Türkiye’s seemingly contradictory policies reflect its primary goal: to maintain the existing balance of power in the BSR.

Türkiye’s stance is driven by independent interests rather an alignment with the West or Russia. For Türkiye, reinforcing the status quo reaffirms their military, economic, and diplomatic power in the BSR. Türkiye prioritizes business and trade to aid its struggling economy. It has also been increasingly positioning itself as a mediator and central diplomatic force; this has informed the country’s decisions to participate in the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) task force (a humanitarian-focused mission) and engage in peacemaking talks with Russia and Ukraine. Türkiye’s commitments are strategic, wishing to avoid provocation of either side while still leveraging their influence in military, resources, and politics.

Challenges for Canada

The major challenge for Canada will be to understand how to approach collaborations with Türkiye in the BSR. Estrangement and misalignment from both parties pose potential problems. Relations only recently improved after Canada placed an embargo following Türkiye’s use of Canadian arms in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria. Türkiye, through its refusal to sanction Russia or permit NATO military presence BSR, has demonstrated that it is not willing to explicitly target Russia. This clashes with Canada’s aim to contain Russian expansionism and protect Ukraine.

Canadian-Turkish military cooperation largely operates through NATO. Both countries participate in Forward Land Forces (FLF) battlegroups, KFOR, NATO Mission Iraq, and Standing NATO Maritime Group Two. While NATO provides a strong foundation, direct partnerships between Canadian and Turkish armed forces are still minimal, thus heightening the chances of estrangement between both sides.

Opportunities for Canada

Despite limitations, there are still opportunities to develop Canadian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Focusing on economic, humanitarian, or regional development initiatives creates common ground. For example, the defence industry is an area of growing partnership. Since Canada lifted the arms embargo on Türkiye, it has become one of Canada’s top export destinations for arms. Türkiye also participates in CANSEC (Canada’s international defence technology conference), and Turkish defence firms travelled to Canada as part of a NATO innovation exercise. The exercise generated technology that enhances automated systems and increases resilience to hybrid offensives. For example, the firm HAVELSAN was able to create a way for automatic systems to operate even if GPS signals are jammed. Existing economic ties between the two countries also provide strong opportunities for investment and technological development which can have positive effects both for defence and for the overall economies of each country.

Building regional capacity is a promising avenue for cooperation. As mentioned above, Türkiye participates in FLF battlegroups, part of NATO’s broader goal to reinforce the eastern flank against Russia. Pursuing similar initiatives in the scope of military modernization could be successful in increasing regional capacity. Furthermore, Canada can draw upon its skills in mediation and development to encourage stable, formal BSR organizations. Both actions can increase the ability for the BSR to safeguard against further destabilization in the region, which is beneficial to Turkish interests. The MCM was able to launch successfully in large part because it was framed as a humanitarian mission. This emphasizes the importance of optics for Türkiye, and should serve as an example of how to navigate different positionalities.

For Canada, the BSR can be a new avenue of partnership, increasing overall soft power and presence. A strong BSR is essential for NATO’s objective to defend Alliance territories. It is also essential for Canada’s efforts to enhance its defence posture and bolster international stability. However, without critically engaging with Türkiye this goal will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, finding relevant but non-conventional ways to collaborate in the BSR is key. Enhancing relations also align with other moves Türkiye has been making to collaborate more closely with other NATO and EU countries which seek similar goals as Canada. With an increasing need for fortification of the BSR, Canada should take the opportunity to distinguish itself as a valuable partner.

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