Türkiye’s Evolving Strategic Posture: Regional Interventions Amidst Shifting NATO Dynamics

This article is the first in a two-part series exploring Türkiye’s evolving strategic posture and its implications for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Focusing on Ankara’s assertive foreign policy in the Middle East and its growing alignment with Russia, this opening piece examines how Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy – particularly through military interventions in Syria, Iraq, and Libya – is reshaping its role within the Alliance. Though a NATO member since 1952, Türkiye has increasingly favored unilateral actions driven by its national security imperatives since Erdoğan became the country’s first directly elected president in 2014, often conflicting with collective NATO objectives. At the same time, deepening defence, energy, and diplomatic ties with Russia have introduced further friction into Türkiye’s relationship with its Euro-Atlantic Allies. The series continues by analyzing the bilateral dimensions of the Türkiye-Russia relationship, assessing the broader consequences for NATO’s internal cohesion and strategic coherence.

Türkiye’s Military Engagements in the Middle East and North Africa

Syria: Strategic Depth and Counter-Kurdish Policy

Türkiye’s military interventions in northern Syria have been shaped by a complex mix of security anxieties, geopolitical ambition, and humanitarian necessity. At the heart of Ankara’s strategy has been its determination to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous zone along its southern border. Turkish officials have long viewed the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), as direct affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—an organization designated as a terrorist group by Türkiye as well as Canada, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU). These concerns have driven Türkiye to launch successive cross-border operations—such as Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring—aimed at dislodging Kurdish forces and establishing Turkish-aligned control in northern Syria.

But Ankara’s motives extended beyond counterterrorism. The war in Syria had, by 2016, spilled into Turkish territory—not only in terms of security but also demographically. Hosting over 3.6 million Syrian refugees, Türkiye became the largest refugee-hosting nation in the world, a burden that was increasingly politicized at home (Erdoğan et al., 2021). Establishing a “safe zone” in Syria became a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy, intended both to prevent further refugee flows and to repatriate hundreds of thousands already within its borders (International Center for Transitional Justice & Bridges of Truth, 2024). These zones were also designed to project Turkish influence deep into Syrian territory, embedding it in the political and security fabric of post-war governance  (Siccardi, 2021).

Crucially, Türkiye’s involvement in Syria was also shaped by an early ambition to see the end of the Assad regime. From the outset of the uprising, Ankara positioned itself as a champion of the Syrian opposition both ideologically, through its alignment with Sunni Islamist groups, and materially, by providing arms, training, and logistical support to rebel forces (Hinnebusch & Saouli, 2019). This support was as much about regime change as it was about reshaping regional order in Türkiye’s image, advancing a Sunni political bloc and therefore counterbalancing Iran’s Shia regional axis.

These efforts, though at times strained by shifting alliances and international dynamics, ultimately played a role in tipping the balance. In late 2024, the Assad regime collapsed under sustained pressure from rebel groups, external actors, and internal economic decline (Zelin & Cagaptay, 2025). A transitional administration comprising elements of the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition has since taken shape, with Ankara quickly moving to formalize relations and deepen its involvement in Syria’s political reconstruction (Cagaptay et al., 2015).

For Türkiye, the fall of the Assad regime is not only a vindication of its long-standing policies but a pivotal opportunity to entrench its role in shaping Syria’s future. By influencing the security architecture of northern Syria, overseeing the return of refugees to newly stabilized regions, and integrating pro-Turkish factions into governing institutions, Ankara aims to transform its once reactive relationship with Syria into long-term strategic influence in the governance of the country.

Yet Türkiye’s assertive policy in Syria frequently brought it into friction with its NATO Allies, exposing sharp divergences in strategy and underlying geopolitical priorities. While NATO as a collective actor avoided direct military intervention and focused instead on counterterrorism, humanitarian relief, and diplomatic resolution (NATO, 2024a), Türkiye pursued unilateral operations aimed not only to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but also to push back Kurdish groups it viewed as existential threats. The core of this discord lay in the military partnership between the US (and some European Allies) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which were largely composed of YPG fighters (Thomas & Zanotti, 2024). From Türkiye’s perspective, this support amounted to arming and legitimizing actors affiliated with the PKK—a red line for Turkish national security. The resulting tensions reached a peak when Türkiye launched major incursions into Kurdish-controlled areas in 2019, prompting US sanctions and open rebuke from European leaders  (Al Jazeera, 2019; Center for Preventive Action, 2025). Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, publicly criticized NATO’s inability to respond to what he termed Türkiye’s “crazy” offensive, and called for Europe to adopt a more autonomous Middle East policy (Banks, 2019). NATO, while recognizing Ankara’s legitimate security concerns, struggled to balance internal cohesion with the conflicting operational agendas of its members on the ground.

Iraq: Persistent Operations Against the PKK

Türkiye’s military footprint in northern Iraq is neither new nor incidental. While cross-border operations against the PKK date back to the 1990s (Lippman, 1995), they have grown in scale and intensity since 2015, evolving into a central pillar of Ankara’s counterterrorism doctrine. The PKK’s entrenched presence in the Qandil Mountains and its periodic attacks on Turkish territory have long been used by Türkiye as rationale for military incursions in the area. However, in recent years, Türkiye has transitioned from short-term raids towards longer, more sustained campaigns – most notably through the multi-phase Operation Claw that was launched in 2019.

Framed by Turkish officials as legitimate self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, these operations are presented as necessary responses to cross-border threats (de Wet, 2019). Nevertheless, the legal foundation remains contested. The Iraqi central government has repeatedly condemned these operations as violations of its sovereignty, stressing that Türkiye’s actions often take place without Baghdad’s consent or coordination. This has fueled diplomatic friction, especially when Turkish strikes have resulted in civilian casualties or targeted areas beyond traditional PKK zones (Bozkurt, 2022).

Türkiye’s engagement in Iraq goes beyond counterinsurgency. It serves as a demonstration of Ankara’s regional autonomy and capacity to shape outcomes independently in a landscape increasingly dominated by non-state actors, shifting alliances, and rival spheres of influence. In many ways, Türkiye’s security strategy in Iraq mirrors its approach in Syria: pre-emptively blocking the emergence of a contiguous Kurdish-controlled corridor that could inspire separatist sentiment among Türkiye’s own Kurdish population (Phillips, 2020).

Interestingly, Turkish operations in Iraq have found some tacit support from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil, despite the PKK’s ideological affinity with parts of the Kurdish population there. Economic interdependence between Türkiye and the KRG – most notably through energy exports and cross-border trade – has facilitated a de facto understanding between the two sides. This informal agreement has enabled Türkiye to expand its military presence through semi-permanent bases and intelligence-sharing mechanisms with the KRG, allowing Ankara to frame its operations as part of a cooperative regional security agenda rather than unilateral aggression (Cagaptay et al., 2015).

While Türkiye’s increasingly expansive operations in northern Iraq have been framed as part of a legitimate counterterrorism strategy, their implications for NATO and regional diplomacy are more complex. Many NATO Allies, including the US, officially designate the PKK as a terrorist organization, aligning in principle with Türkiye’s security concerns and justifications for military action. On several occasions, NATO’s previous Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged Türkiye’s right to self-defence under international law and affirmed the Alliance’s solidarity with Türkiye in its fight against terrorism (Sander, 2015). However, NATO has not directly participated in Türkiye’s operations against the PKK in Iraq (Kurdistan24, 2018). Instead, the Alliance’s presence in the country is limited to the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), a non-combat advisory initiative aimed at strengthening Iraqi security forces and preventing the resurgence of ISIS—operating strictly with the consent of the Iraqi government and with respect for its sovereignty (NATO, 2025). This divergence in operational scope has at times strained NATO’s diplomatic posture as some NATO members have raised concerns over the proportionality of Turkish strikes and their impact on civilians (Foltyn, 2025). Moreover, the Iraqi government has repeatedly condemned these incursions as violations of its sovereignty, demanding greater respect for territorial integrity and urging Ankara to resolve security matters through diplomatic channels  (Fraser & Abdul-zahra, 2025). This has placed NATO in a delicate balancing act—supporting a key member’s counterterrorism prerogatives while trying to maintain legitimacy and strategic coherence in a region already fraught with competing interests and fragile state authority.

Libya: Maritime Ambitions and Military Intervention

In late 2019, Ankara signed a military cooperation agreement and a maritime boundary deal with the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. These agreements paved the way for Turkish deployment of drones, military advisors, and Syrian mercenaries to halt the advance of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) on Tripoli.

Türkiye’s intervention in Libya marked one of its most significant instances power projection in North Africa and the broader Mediterranean. Far from being a reactive maneuver, Ankara’s decision to back the UN-recognized GNA was grounded in a set of well-calibrated strategic objectives. Türkiye sought to reshape the post-conflict order in Libya to favour its regional vision, while simultaneously using the Libyan theatre to assert its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. By providing the GNA with equipment and personnel, Ankara not only changed the balance on the battlefield but also established a foothold in the strategic maritime corridors off Libya’s coast (Young, 2020).

This intervention allowed Türkiye to contest the emerging anti-Ankara axis of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Greece, whose growing cooperation in the Mediterranean was perceived by Türkiye as an encirclement strategy. The maritime delimitation agreement signed between Türkiye and the GNA in November 2019 was central to preventing this perceived encirclement. By creating an Exclusive Economic Zone that stretched across contested waters, this agreement bolstered Türkiye’s legal claims to potential energy exploration zones and directly challenged Greek maritime assertions (Badi & al-Jabassini, 2025).

Beyond the geopolitical chessboard, ideological alignment also played a role in this situation. Türkiye’s support for the GNA was a continuation of its broader alliance with Qatar. Both countries have championed Sunni Islamist movements across the region, viewing political Islam not only as an ideological ally but also as a tool for fostering influence in post-authoritarian states. In Libya, this translated into robust support for factions aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, countering the more secular, military-backed leadership of General Khalifa Haftar, who was supported by Egypt, the UAE, France, and Russia (Baskan, 2016). Türkiye’s intervention was pivotal in halting Haftar’s assault on Tripoli in early 2020, marking a decisive shift in Libya’s civil war. Turkish-backed forces pushed the LNA into retreat, forcing a ceasefire and eventually contributing to the fragile UN-led political process that produced Libya’s interim Government of National Unity. This success has given Türkiye considerable leverage in shaping Libya’s political reconstruction, military restructuring, and economic recovery, particularly in sectors such as infrastructure, defense, and energy (International Crisis Group, 2020).

Contrary to Türkiye’s long-term and strategic involvement in Libya, NATO’s earlier involvement in the Libyan conflict was more limited, reactive, and governed by a multilateral legal framework. NATO’s 2011 intervention, known as Operation Unified Protector, was conducted under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 which mandated the use of all necessary means to protect civilians under threat from Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. The Alliance’s goals were narrowly defined: enforce a no-fly zone, implement an arms embargo, and prevent further violence against civilians. NATO’s actions were supported by the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) and conducted in coordination with a broad international coalition, reflecting a commitment to multilateral norms and legitimacy (NATO, 2024b). NATO naval forces patrolled the Mediterranean to enforce the arms embargo, denying transit to vessels suspected of smuggling weapons in and out of Libya. After Gaddafi’s fall, NATO withdrew, repeatedly emphasizing support for a political resolution, national unity, and the creation of integrated state institutions, including a unified military and secure borders (NATO, 2011). Türkiye’s engagement, by contrast, developed over time into a deeply embedded presence in Libyan affairs. While NATO promoted a neutral and internationally sanctioned mission, Türkiye acted independently and often in friction with other NATO Allies – most notably France – whose interests in Libya diverged sharply (France 24, 2020). Thus, while both NATO and Türkiye operated under the banner of civilian protection and support for a recognized Libyan government, their timing, motivations, and strategic depth of involvement diverged significantly, highlighting Türkiye’s emergence as an autonomous regional actor pursuing influence far beyond alliance consensus.

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