Armenia after the 2026 Elections: Promise and Peril

· The Civil Contract Party, led by Nikol Pashinyan, won a decisive majority in Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections, overcoming a significant Russian disinformation campaign.

· Pashinyan’s effort to promote trade and stability through improving relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan remains challenged as Russia increases sanctions on Armenian goods.

· The European Union (EU), United States (US) and Canada play vital roles in supporting the only liberal democracy in the geopolitically critical South Caucasus.

Armenia’s Post-Election Environment

Parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026, gave Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party 49.8% of the vote, far outpacing rival parties. Civil Contract secured 64 seats in the 105-seat parliament, six short of the two-thirds majority needed to change Armenia’s Constitution.

Pashinyan faces a challenging environment despite his party’s convincing electoral win. Memories of the loss of Artsakh/Karabakh remain fresh, and trauma from the conflict continues to permeate society. Russia also retains a strong interest in Armenia, as seen through the recent disinformation campaign and failed effort to install Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karpetyan as prime minister during the election.

Armenia is nonetheless currently experiencing unprecedented levels of economic growth. Long-standing border violence with Azerbaijan has also ceased. Still, Pashinyan and his government must navigate geopolitical issues that could—at any moment—return Armenia to volatility or conflict.

Azerbaijan

Rumours flew in Spring 2026 that Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev would sign a peace agreement to formalise Azerbaijani control of Nagorno-Karabakh and address outstanding bilateral issues. Relations between the two countries have improved surrounding the Washington Declaration of August 8, 2025. Formalising the so-called Trump Road for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the Washington Declaration committed both Armenia and Azerbaijan to improving transport routes and progressing towards normalising relations. Since the Declaration, third-country railway routes between Armenia and Azerbaijan have opened, and dialogue has begun, including the November 2025 Peace Bridge Initiative linking civil society actors. Azerbaijani experts interviewed by the author in Baku stated that they believed Pashinyan’s election would offer a chance for an enduring peace.

Despite such optimism, an agreement between Pashinyan and Aliyev never materialised. The Baku interlocutors noted that President Aliyev considers Armenia’s constitutional preamble to imply continued Armenian claims over Nagorno-Karabakh and is insisting it be changed before moving to any formal agreement. Pashinyan has begun the process of constitutional change, but the election results leave him short of the two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution in parliament. Even after parliamentary changes, a new constitution would need to be sent to a referendum, requiring both 50%+ support and 50%+ turnout for ratification. Armenian observers remain sceptical that the parliament or public has the will to change the constitution to placate Aliyev. An electoral campaign would also be fertile ground for a Russian disinformation campaign.

Pashinyan’s most plausible strategy appears to be engaging in smaller measures with the Azerbaijanis, such as border delimitation, economic relations and supporting the Peace Bridge. Time and concrete results might sway parliamentarians and public opinion. This will require Aliyev’s cooperation. The Azerbaijani president, confident in military superiority, can always reactivate talk of renewing conflict. Washington’s interest in TRIPP renders a future invasion of Armenian territory less likely, but anti-Armenian rhetoric can galvanize Azerbaijani public opinion behind the authoritarian state.

Türkiye

Turkish-Armenian relations have improved since the 2020/2023 Karabakh wars, when Turks provided military assistance to Azerbaijan. Recent efforts have focused on a staged opening of the closed Turkish-Armenian border, including allowing crossings of third-party nationals and railway traffic. Both countries understand an open border would provide economic benefits, facilitating participation in burgeoning Middle Corridor traffic linking Europe to Central Asia and China. TRIPP, which has progressed to framework agreements and may see shovels in the ground in 2027, should deepen rapprochement.

Sources interviewed by the author note tension between Turkish and Azerbaijani diplomats, which became open when both attended the May 2026 Yerevan Dialogue Conference. The Turkish delegation believes Azerbaijan is attempting to exercise an effective veto on border opening. Relations between Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remain strong, however, and Aliyev would prefer the border remain closed.

Russia

Even after their failed election intervention, Russia retains multiple levers of influence over Armenia. On the economic front, Russia has banned imports of Armenian fruits, vegetables and – as of July 2026 – milk. This economic chokehold has produced suffering for Armenian farmers, dependent on exporting goods to Russia. Russia also imposes itself militarily through its base in Gyumri, near the Turkish border in northwestern Armenia. Russia is refraining, however, from broader measures, including raising energy prices, which would have a significant impact given that Armenia relies on Russia for 82% of its gas supply. The outlook of the Russia-Armenia relationship is also difficult to predict. Armenia’s informal economy appears to provide a pathway for Russia’s sanction-busting, while Pashinyan travelled to Russia in July 2026 in an effort to smooth relations.

The European Union, United States and Canada

Russia’s sanctions and interference reflect Armenia’s westward tilt. Pashinyan has actively courted European investment throughout his time in power. This strategy has continued; the EU-Armenia Summit in Yerevan in May 2026 produced a connectivity agreement and progress on security, defence and visa issues. Armenia has also initiated studies toward EU membership.

The US overseer of TRIPP, Konstantin Sokolov, has purchased a stake in an Armenian copper-molybdenum mine. Iran is a wild card in the US role; the planned TRIPP railway linking Azerbaijan, Armenia and Türkiye comes a few hundred meters from the Iranian border.

Canada’s embassy in Armenia has increased its importance. Canada is encouraging investment and assisting in legal and administrative reforms. Canada can further assist Armenia in countering Russian destabilisation efforts, including cyber-monitoring, while also mobilising its Armenian diaspora, which dislikes Pashinyan’s engagement with Türkiye and Azerbaijan. For Armenia to survive, much less prosper, investment from North American and European diasporas is vital.

Given Georgia’s authoritarian drift, Armenia is the one hope for liberal democracy in the South Caucasus. Europe and North America should work diligently to counter potential moves by Russia, or Azerbaijan, that might reverse the country’s progress and increase the risk of conflict.

Policy Recommendations

· Facilitate incremental progress between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Türkiye, noting the benefits of access to European markets and greater Western investment.

· Develop alternatives for Russian markets and energy. Focus on rural areas where economic suffering is acute and youth depopulation significant. Outline clear pathways towards deepening partnership with the EU.

· Foster engagement between the Armenian diaspora and the Pashinyan government.

· Build trust between the Armenians and Western institutions to counter Russian disinformation.

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