Iran’s Strategic Recalibration in the South Caucasus after the 2025 Washington Agreement and the 2026 Israeli American Intervention

Since the onset of the joint United States–Israeli military campaign against Iran in February 2026, developments in the Middle East have emerged as a primary driver of global strategic assessments. The conflict is simultaneously generating significant secondary effects in the South Caucasus, reshaping regional alignments and the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

By assessing Iran’s relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, its core strategic interests in the South Caucasus, and its operational partnership with Moscow, this policy memo examines how the ongoing war against Iran, combined with the August 2025 Washington Accords, has disrupted Tehran’s long-standing hedging strategy and could undermine its regional influence.

To illustrate this shift, the memo first analyzes Iran’s traditional foreign policy toward Armenia and Azerbaijan and how the Washington Accords have diminished Iran’s geoeconomic role as a buffer between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby constraining its ability to exert leverage over both states. It further evaluates how the agreement heightens Iran’s strategic vulnerabilities in the face of growing Turkish, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and U.S. presence in the region, and highlights the increasingly divergent interests and approaches of Moscow and Tehran in shaping the future of the South Caucasus.

Engaging with the outcomes of the United States–Israeli military campaign against Iran, the policy memo concludes by analyzing Tehran’s shifting strategic posture in the South Caucasus. This assessment is situated within the context of Iran’s amicable yet strategically incongruent relationship with Moscow, as well as its intensifying competition with Türkiye for regional influence.

Iran’s Core Interests in the South Caucasus: Economic Pragmatism over Ideology

Iran views the South Caucasus as part of its immediate security periphery rather than a distant foreign region. While Tehran has historical and cultural ties with the region, its policy toward the area has been driven primarily by geopolitical stability, border security, and connectivity considerations rather than ideological or religious affinity. Although Tehran formally maintained neutrality during the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, in practice it pursued a balancing strategy aimed at preventing regional dominance by any single actor. Much like Russia’s approach in the region, the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict generated a degree of political instability that enabled Tehran and Moscow to preserve their influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while simultaneously constraining Türkiye’s ability to expand its regional presence. Iran’s strategy has also emphasized the importance of preventing alterations to internationally recognized borders and safeguarding its access to European markets.

In the aftermath of Armenia’s military defeats in 2020 and 2023, and amid Moscow’s failure to uphold its perceived security commitments under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework and its peacekeeping mandate, Iran increasingly came to be portrayed as one of Armenia’s most reliable regional partners. Iran–Armenia post-Soviet relations have been stable and cooperative. Since Armenia’s independence, Iran has consistently maintained friendly and strategically significant ties with Yerevan, supporting Armenia, both state and people, during regional crises and serving as a key transit partner. In the aftermath of the Turkish–Azerbaijani blockade of the 1990s, Iran has functioned as a critical terrestrial access route and economic partner. The two countries are also involved in many trade and energy partnerships and collaborate in the transit of goods between Europe and Asia.

While both nations share a foundational identity as Shia-majority states, the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan has been characterized by persistent strategic friction since 1991. Central to Tehran’s security concerns is Baku’s deepening military-industrial and energy partnership with Israel, which, alongside Azerbaijan’s “one nation, two states” alliance with Türkiye, is viewed by Iranian policymakers as a coordinated effort to contain Iranian regional influence.

This tension is further exacerbated by the geopolitical implications of the Zangezur Corridor. From Tehran’s perspective, any Azerbaijani effort to establish a sovereign land link through southern Armenia constitutes a “red line,” as it threatens to sever Iran’s critical northern transit link to Europe and the Caucasus. Despite these structural rivalries, the relationship maintains a degree of pragmatic stability. Both states remain tethered by mutual economic interests, specifically their shared roles in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and Baku’s continued reliance on Iranian territory for transit to its Nakhchivan exclave.

Iran’s regional approach has been shaped less by the Muslim–Christian divide or ideological concerns and more by practical and security concerns over Turkish influence, Israeli presence near its borders, transit routes affecting its access to Eurasia, and the potential domestic repercussions among its own Azeri population. Iran views the Caucasus as its “historic security margin” and its immediate security and economic environment.

The 2025 Washington Agreement and its Initial Implementation Framework

In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the Washington Accords under the mediation of the President of the United States, launching the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and establishing a 99-year economic partnership between the United States and Armenia. The Washington Accords create opportunities for significant shifts in regional transit dynamics, including the movement of goods, energy infrastructure, and the broader interconnection between Asia and Europe. These developments have implications for the roles traditionally played by Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus in Eurasian transport and trade networks. It reduces Central Asian countries’ dependency on Chinese and Russian infrastructures as well as bypassing Iran’s role in the Middle Corridor.

In January 2026, the United States and Armenia signed the TRIPP Implementation Framework providing exclusive rights to develop the transit infrastructure. The framework excludes extraterritorial rights to American entities preserving Armenia’s sovereignty including the border management aspect of the transit corridor. In this partnership, the TRIPP Development Company, a joint venture with Armenia mostly controlled by Washington, provides a monopoly in the development business surrounding the route and its infrastructure. The agreement seeks to develop the Syunik region as a hub of economic activity and local development, with the objective of enhancing transit and connectivity between Asia and Europe, connecting Azerbaijan with its autonomous region of Nakhichevan. More broadly, the TRIPP becomes a competitive alternative to the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railroad and future alternative pipeline to Europe, competing with Baku–Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by securing European access to Central Asian hydrocarbons.

In the energy domain, the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan reshapes the region’s broader transit and supply landscape. Most notably, Armenia could become significantly less dependent on Russian and Iran natural gas, thereby opening possibilities for access to Central Asian hydrocarbons and, potentially, to Azerbaijani energy sources. Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas competes with Iran’s gas output, offering a cheaper and potentially more politically reliable alternative for European countries. Azerbaijan launched the construction of energy infrastructure, including a new transit powerline to export to Europe through Türkiye.

The Accord has inaugurated a new phase of cooperation between the former belligerents, notably facilitating the renewed transit of goods between the two states. This includes the movement of hydrocarbons originating in Azerbaijan as well as grain exports from Russia and various Central Asian countries. The emerging prospects for a peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan have broadened the diplomatic space for both states, transforming their engagement into a more intricate and multidimensional interaction. Furthermore, the TRIPP effectively eliminates Moscow’s role as established in the November 2020 agreement, which delegated some administrative control over border management to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

Although the Washington Accords do not provide any security guarantees from the United States or include enforcement mechanisms directed toward Azerbaijan, Armenia leaders hope that increased American investment would encourage a more active role by Washington and put an end to Baku’s strategy of outbidding Yerevan in their bilateral relationship.

Overall, the TRIPP represents, for Armenia, an additional step toward the West, thereby weakening Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus, while also providing an opportunity to normalize relations with Ankara and Baku. For Azerbaijan, the Washington Accords consolidate its military victory, while re-establishing direct access to Nakhchivan and stimulating its transit-based economy. Furthermore, the TRIPP reduces Baku’s dependency and uncertainties link to its main transit route to Europe going through Georgia.

Iran’s Strategic Approach in the South Caucasus after the Washington Accords

Much of the analytical and media commentary has framed recent developments as a geostrategic, zero‑sum contest in which the United States and Türkiye have successfully marginalized both Iran and Russia from regional influence. While geostrategic and security considerations remain central, it is necessary to look beyond great power and regional competition to understand how Iran and Russia are recalibrating their relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan and assessing areas of mutual convergence to avoid strategic marginalization.

Following the Washington Declaration and TRIPP announcement, the Iran official diplomatic position was articulated by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in a telephone conversation with his Armenian counterpart. While welcoming peace efforts and regional connectivity, Araghchi specified Iran’s red lines: there must be no extraterritorial corridor or special status undermining Armenian sovereign control, and no changes that alter regional geopolitics or disadvantage Iran’s strategic access. He further emphasized full respect for borders, territorial integrity, and national jurisdiction, and stressed that connectivity must not isolate Iran from established or alternative transit routes.

However, an examination of various members of the Foreign Policy establishment could shed light on various aspects of Iran’s understanding of this situation. On 9 August 2025, Ali Akbar Velayati, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a senior advisor to the former Supreme Leader of Iran, framed the TRIPP as a rebranding of the Zangezur corridor concept. He said that the implementation of this project would restrict Iran’s transport routes in the north and northwest to (only) Türkiye, and that Iran will confront this move ‘whether with Russia or without it.’ He likened NATO’s presence along this route to a ‘viper’ that wants to lie down between Iran and Russia and warned that Iran will not allow this alliance to approach its northern borders. The former Supreme Leader himself in a meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan, in July 2024, had mentioned that Iran recognizes that the Zangezur Corridor is against Armenia’s interests and stands in this position.

Other Iranian officials however, adopted a more moderate position and sought further clarification as the details, terms, and conditions of the TRIPP are not clear yet. In a meeting with Armenia’s National Security Council Secretary, the former head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, Kamal Kharrazi, welcomed Armenia–Azerbaijan connectivity but requested clarification regarding the governing legal and security framework of the route, particularly any external involvement. The Armenian side emphasized that border control and security would remain under Armenian authority. This exchange illustrates Tehran’s core concern: not connectivity itself, but the jurisdictional and security regime under which it would operate.

Noting the travel of Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Vahan Kostanyan, to Israel, Iran observes a ‘deviation’ from historical relationships. Kostanyan is closely involved in the implementation of the TRIPP initiative. The trip may therefore be understood not only as a diplomatic engagement but also as part of Armenia’s efforts to advance the corridor and related regional connectivity arrangements. From the Iranian perspective, Armenia has not sufficiently taken Tehran’s ‘concerns’ into account while proceeding with the project, which gives the visit broader regional significance beyond bilateral diplomacy. Current uncertainties and tensions are therefore portrayed not as a structural rivalry but as a recent policy shift by Armenia toward Western initiatives, which Tehran views as inconsistent with the traditionally predictable relationship.

Although these responses appear to represent hard-line and moderate positions, they in fact reflect Iranian concerns articulated at two different levels of policy. Velayati’s warning conveys the strategic perception of the corridor as a geopolitical and security challenge that could alter regional balances and introduce external influence near Iran’s borders. Kharrazi’s more measured statements address the operational level, focusing on the legal and jurisdictional arrangements governing the route and the necessity of preserving Armenian sovereignty and local border control. Taken together, they are complementary rather than contradictory: the first signals Iran’s red lines in terms of regional balance of power, while the second defines the specific conditions under which connectivity could be tolerated. This dual messaging suggests that Tehran’s opposition is directed not at transport connectivity itself, but at any arrangement that diminishes Iran’s strategic position or creates a non-sovereign security regime along its northwestern frontier.

Drawing on Russia’s conduct in cases such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Syrian Civil War, Iranian assessments of Moscow’s position on the TRIPP are broadly consistent with longer-standing perceptions of Russia across Iran’s political spectrum. These range from proponents of deeper strategic alignment with Russia, to more skeptical voices that view reliance on Moscow as a strategic liability, such as those featured in Etemad and Shargh newspapers. Between these poles, a significant group of policymakers and experts adopts a position of cautious realism, advocating sustained engagement with Russia while maintaining a clear political safety margin featured in Donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper. Notably, across these perspectives there is a shared underlying assumption: Russia is not regarded as a fully predictable or reliably-aligned partner.

The Erosion of Iran’s Transit Hub Centrality

Iran’s policy toward the South Caucasus cannot be understood without reference to its broader economic strategy. In recent years, Tehran has increasingly framed its foreign policy around geo-economics rather than solely sanctions resistance and relief. A strategic guidance issued by the Supreme Leader and the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (June 2024) explicitly direct the government to activate Iran’s ‘geopolitical advantages’ by transforming the country into a regional hub for trade, transport, and energy through regulatory reforms and infrastructure development.

The Development Plan intends to institutionalize this objective. It mandates the creation of a Regional Energy Trade Steering Committee, chaired by the President and composed of the Ministers of Oil, Foreign Affairs, and Energy, with parliamentary participation. The Committee is responsible for designing Iran’s regional energy diplomacy roadmap and approving export, import, swap, transit, and electricity exchange arrangements. These measures show that Iran is indeed attempting to convert geography into economic resilience: transit fees, energy swaps, and logistics services are intended to compensate for sanctions-related restrictions on direct trade and investment.

A central quantitative target of the Development Plan is to increase annual transit cargo volume from approximately 16 million tons at the beginning of the Plan to 40 million tons by its conclusion. The South Caucasus plays a crucial role in achieving this goal because it constitutes Iran’s shortest overland connection to Eurasian markets. The Iran-Armenia border effectively blocks a continuous Türkiye-Azerbaijan land corridor, thereby preserving Türkiye’s dependence on Iranian transit routes toward Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Iran participates in wider regional energy arrangements, including gas swap agreements with Turkmenistan and Türkiye. These arrangements allow Tehran to earn transit revenue, estimated at roughly $1–1.5 billion annually, while maintaining relevance in regional energy distribution networks. It also conducts gas and electricity swaps with Azerbaijan to supply the Nakhchivan exclave. Additionally, it serves as a trucking corridor between Türkiye and Central Asia, currently transiting tens of thousands of Turkish trucks annually.

However, emerging infrastructure projects threaten to erode this position. The Iğdır–Nakhchivan gas pipeline, operational since March 2025, already reduces Nakhchivan’s dependence on Iranian gas swaps. If an additional pipeline link across southern Armenia were completed, Azerbaijan would obtain a direct energy connection to its exclave, while Armenia would diversify its energy supply away from Iran. With the TRIPP, Turkmenistan’s and Azerbaijan’s natural gas exports directly compete with Iran’s output by providing Armenia with flexibility and lower‑cost alternatives.

More broadly, the proposed TRIPP corridor could connect Türkiye to Central Asia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian basin, thereby rendering the second route of the Middle Corridor practically feasible as a bypass to Iranian transit routes connecting China and Central Asia to Europe. Furthermore, the TRIPP would strengthen the Middle Corridor and its overreliance on Georgia as a transit route.

For Tehran, the issue is not merely symbolic. Such routes would divert trucking flows, logistics investment, and energy transit away from Iran, potentially reducing transit income by a significant margin and weakening incentives for infrastructure development. Iranian analyses estimate potential losses reaching up to 2.6 billion dollars annually over time when indirect effects on logistics, investment, and associated services are considered.

Even more important than immediate revenue is what Iranian policymakers call ‘route optionality.’ Iran seeks to preserve independent land access to the Caucasus and Europe that does not depend exclusively on Turkish–Azerbaijani territory. The South Caucasus therefore functions not only as an economic opportunity but as a strategic economic lifeline. Any corridor that structurally marginalizes Iranian transit routes is perceived in Tehran not as a normal infrastructure project but as a long-term reduction of Iran’s geopolitical and economic leverage.

A Trojan Horse on Iran’s Doorstep: After Türkiye and Israel, now NATO and the USA

Tehran’s security concerns centre on preserving the sovereignty structure along its northwestern frontier. Iranian officials emphasize the maintenance of internationally recognized borders and oppose any extraterritorial or internationally supervised transit arrangements in the Syunik province. In Iranian strategic perception, a transport corridor is not merely an infrastructure project but a potential security regime: if administered or monitored by external actors, it could facilitate intelligence collection, surveillance, and the institutionalization of foreign, especially American and Israeli, presence near sensitive Iranian regions. The Washington Accords remain vague regarding which actors will be responsible for providing daily security along the TRIPP corridor, even though Armenia is formally recognized as retaining sovereignty over its territory. This ambiguity leaves open the possibility that American private security or military contractors could assume a role in protecting the route. Consequently, Iran’s opposition is directed less at connectivity itself than at any arrangement that alters jurisdictional control or introduces external security actors along its immediate border.

The intensity of Velayati’s remarks is best understood by factoring in the role of the U.S. in this initiative. According to Korosh Ahmadi, a former Iranian diplomat, in Iranian foreign policy thinking, where some officials regard antagonism with the U.S. as structural, any development in which Washington emerges as the agent of regional normalization would be viewed negatively. He therefore situates the corridor within Iran’s long-standing confrontation with the U.S., arguing that it would elevate Washington’s position as a political arbiter in the South Caucasus while creating a connectivity framework from which all regional actors – Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Western partners – would benefit, except Iran. In this interpretation, the corridor itself is not the principal concern; rather, the accompanying political arrangements could institutionalize U.S. influence and leave Iran structurally excluded from emerging regional trade and security networks. Velayati’s rhetoric thus reflects a broader fear of geopolitical marginalization under a U.S.-backed regional order.

Türkiye’s Pan‑Turkic Orientation and Its Strategic Implications for Iran

Iran opposes any extraterritorial corridor arrangements that would create a continuous Türkiye- Azerbaijan land connection and facilitate the Middle Corridor linking Türkiye, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Iranian experts assess that such a route would shift the regional balance in favor of Türkiye, structurally reduce Iran’s role in east–west connectivity, and diminish Tehran’s leverage in Eurasian trade and energy networks. Following the recent wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Washington Accord, Türkiye appears a step closer toward its regional ambitions focused on pan-Turkism ranging from Anatolia to Central Asia.

Tehran interprets the TRIPP as a rebranded Zangezur Corridor that constitutes a geopolitical and security threat that could undermine Iran’s geoeconomic relevance in the transit between Asia and Europe by reducing dependency of regional actors on Iranian transit routes.

Within Iranian strategic discourse, the project is also interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical realignment across Eurasia. Iranian officials and senior advisers have argued that a continuous transport axis from Anatolia to Central Asia would expand Turkish political and economic influence, weaken Iran’s geoeconomic centrality, and potentially enable a wider external security presence in the South Caucasus. From Tehran’s perspective, the concern is less ideological than structural: a functioning Middle Corridor could bypass Iranian territory while embedding new political, military, and intelligence partnerships near Iran’s northwestern frontier.

At the same time, Iran appears to have avoided the worst‑case scenario that had emerged following the one‑day 2023 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the subsequent escalation in Azerbaijani rhetoric, particularly the invocation of the ‘Western Azerbaijan’ concept.3 Likewise, Baku’s promotion of a ‘special corridor’— envisioned within the broader Zangezur Corridor framework and implying strong Azerbaijani–Turkish control — had raised significant concerns in Tehran regarding potential geopolitical and territorial encroachments. It would have materially shifted regional power toward the Turkish bloc and most likely completely exclude Iran from connectivity, linking Europe to Asia.

Between Alignment and Competition: Russia and Iran’s South Caucasus Strategy

In the South Caucasus, Russian and Iranian foreign policies converge in their shared willingness to counter Western influence and to constrain Ankara’s expanding regional role. This alignment is also reflected in their cooperation within the International North–South Transport Corridor, which both states have leveraged to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. However, the North–South Transport Corridor remains inefficient and weakened by the prospects of the TRIPP and future Azerbaijan and Armenia collaboration.

At the same time, Moscow and Tehran continue to pursue distinct regional and geopolitical objectives aimed at advancing their own interests and influence in the South Caucasus rather than form a cohesive strategic approach as a functional partnership. The Washington Accords highlight these underlying frictions, particularly in revealing the absence of a coordinated Russian–Iranian position toward the TRIPP. The corridor itself is part of a wider geopolitical contest over connectivity, influence, and control in the South Caucasus, where transport routes translate directly into political and economic leverage.

Just like Iran, Moscow has voiced general concerns and skepticism regarding the TRIPP, its implementation, and its impact on the region. Russia’s official reaction to the Washington Declaration reflects this partial but imperfect convergence. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded cautiously, emphasizing regional stability and existing agreements while avoiding direct confrontation with the initiative. Moscow has been careful not to antagonize Washington or to openly criticize American President Donald Trump, while underscoring its indispensable role in ensuring the success of the TRIPP.

Iranian commentary, however, interpreted this as an ambiguous position and expressed dissatisfaction that Moscow did not oppose the project more explicitly. The former Head of Iran’s Planning and Budget Organization observes that Russia is transitioning from dominant security hegemon in the Caucasus to a constrained, reactive actor that seeks to manage decline through selective cooperation and behind-the-scenes leverage. From Tehran’s perspective, Russia is expected to resist new mediation formats that elevate Western involvement in the South Caucasus; Moscow’s restrained response therefore raised concerns in Iran about the reliability of Russian support. The episode illustrates that, although Iran and Russia share reservations about a U.S.-centred regional framework, their threat perceptions and priorities are not identical, and cooperation between them remains situational rather than fully coordinated.

In this context, Iran finds areas of partial convergence with Russia’s policy in the South Caucasus. Both states regard the proposed corridor with caution, as it could enable a new connectivity and mediation architecture in the region that would diminish their influence while expanding the presence of external actors — primarily Türkiye and the United States, but potentially China as well. Although their motivations differ, the project is perceived in both capitals as contributing to a regional order in which Western-backed arrangements gain prominence at the expense of Iranian and Russian leverage and the increasing influence of NATO countries in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, it weakens existing regional frameworks involving Russia, Iran, and Türkiye, such as the 3+3 initiatives and the Six-Country Regional Cooperation. Additionally, Armenia’s shift toward Western influence is perceived by both countries as a growing risk to their regional interests.

For Tehran, the primary concerns relate to border security and the risk of exclusion from emerging regional transit networks. For Moscow, the issue is more closely tied to the erosion of its longstanding role as the principal security arbiter in the South Caucasus and, more broadly, to the setbacks confronting its neoimperial ambitions in the region weakened by Russia’s war against Ukraine.

While Russia and Iran share a primary interest in resisting the growing presence of NATO and Western influence in the South Caucasus, persistent divergences have prevented them from coordinating an effective strategic approach. Even prior to the TRIPP initiative, certain analysts, such as Mohsen Pak Aeen, Iran’s former ambassador to Baku, had warned over Russia’s ambiguous position on Zangezur corridor. Iranian analysts often describe Russia’s position as ambiguous and more flexible than Tehran’s, particularly on ‘who manages’ an eventual arrangement. They believe that Russia’s position on the Zangezur corridor reflects a broader pattern in its relationship with Iran: it is not a truly strategic partnership but rather a transactional one driven by shifting interests. In this context, the implicit message for Iran is to exercise caution. Russia may not be a reliable partner and could instrumentalize Iran’s position to advance its own regional objectives. For example, in 2026, Moscow sought to renew its influence in the South Caucasus by seeking to fix its relationship with Baku, as well as influencing the democratic process in Armenia and the election of a pro-Russian government.

The February 2026 War and Its Implications

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint military operations against Iran, targeting its nuclear and missile capabilities with broader regime-change ambitions. While military objectives appear achievable in the short term, the political outcome remains deeply uncertain. The South Caucasus has thus far remained largely insulated from the conflict, despite Azerbaijan’s ties to Israel and limited Iranian strikes on Nakhchivan international airport and alleged terrorist plots supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeting the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Iran’s posture toward Türkiye and the broader region remains ambiguous mainly due to precarious geopolitical positions and its internal turmoil. Türkiye, however, despite certain immediate challenges such as increased energy prices, sees opportunities in consolidating its status as a regional energy hub and crossroads.

Russia’s response to the war has been evaluated as insufficient – even unacceptable – by Iran’s former ambassador to Moscow. He attributes this restraint to Russia’s self-interest, particularly economic gains and strategic distractions linked to Ukraine. His assessment implies that despite rhetoric of strategic partnership, Russia behaves as a pragmatic actor that supports Iran only when it aligns with its own interests, raising serious doubts about its reliability in moments of crisis. At the same time, Russia appears to be playing a low-profile but consequential role by supplying Tehran with actionable intelligence on U.S. military targets, as well as with operational lessons derived from the war in Ukraine, particularly regarding the employment of unmanned aerial systems and electronic warfare capabilities. This collaboration represents a full circle, following Iran’s transfer of Shahed drones to Russia at the outset of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Tehran not only provided the drones themselves but also offered technical support and assistance that enabled Moscow to establish its own production line for the Geran-2, the Russian version of the Shahed drone.

Regardless of the outcomes of the 2026 military campaign or the prospect of regime change in Iran, Tehran’s geostrategic competition with Türkiye over Eurasian transit routes is likely to remain a powerful geographic and economic force shaping the South Caucasus. Türkiye’s ambition to establish a pan-Turkic corridor linking Anatolia to Central Asia via the Caspian Sea — while bypassing Iranian territory — poses a sustained threat to Iran’s transit revenues and strategic depth, irrespective of the composition of the governing regime in Tehran.

Even in the event of regime collapse and its replacement by a government aligned with U.S. and broader Western preferences, or a significantly weakened state deprived of key military instruments for projecting influence in the South Caucasus, competition between Iran and Türkiye over Eurasian transit corridors is likely to persist. This rivalry predates the establishment of the Islamic Republic and would almost certainly outlast it. No Iranian government will find Turkish dominance of the Eurasian corridor to be in Iran’s national interest. This is a structural feature of the regional balance of power rather than an ideological preference.

While the nature of the governing regime in Tehran may shape the extent and modalities of Iran’s participation in the TRIPP, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the underlying structural competition with Türkiye and the lack of a common strategic approach with Russia. A more democratic Iranian government could, in fact, pursue a more proactive integration into the TRIPP-linked infrastructure, potentially positioning Iran as a critical southern corridor connecting Eurasian transit networks to the Persian Gulf. A pro-Western Iran, freed from sanctions and able to attract Western investment, may prove a more effective competitor to Turkish corridor dominance than the Islamic Republic was – because it can engage international financial systems and offer regional partners a credible alternative. Along this line, some factions within the Iranian government have already highlighted a potential role for Iran in the TRIPP, particularly by linking the proposed railway to a broader North–South axis that would connect Iran to the project.

Overall, the most likely scenario is a weakened Iran embroiled in prolonged transition and domestic challenges, where the outcomes of the 2026 war and the popular mobilization against the regime forces the Islamic Republic into a posture of survival and tactical concession, producing a prolonged period of U.S.-Iran negotiations. Although the TRIPP constitutes a secondary concern relative to regime survival, particularly in a context of elite fragmentation and competition over residual state assets, including security forces, revenue streams, and territorial authority, it nevertheless reflects deeper structural dynamics. Specifically, regional competition with Türkiye is likely to remain a defining feature of Iran’s strategic environment.

Overall, Iran’s capacity to oppose the TRIPP would be significantly diminished in a context of internal fragmentation, where the central government struggles to maintain a coherent and strategic policy orientation. As domestic contestation over authority, resources, and coercive instruments intensifies, Tehran is unlikely to either mount an effective opposition to the TRIPP or engage with it in a consistent and constructive manner. This erosion of state capacity would, in turn, weaken Iran’s position along its northern frontier with Armenia, potentially transforming the Syunik region into both an economic and security vulnerability.

For Türkiye, the 2026 war could constitute a strategic window of opportunity to consolidate its influence in the South Caucasus. With Iran internally weakened and Russia preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, Ankara face fewer constraints in advancing the Middle Corridor pan-Turkic connectivity agenda. In such a scenario, both Armenia and Azerbaijan may increasingly view Türkiye as a reliable regional partner, particularly if Ankara’s initiatives are reinforced by support from the United States and the Trump administration and by broader Western engagement. At the same time, the weakening of Iran could result on unintended consequences, such as the renewal of Kurdish militancy at Turkish borders.

Conclusion

The renewed U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus catalyzed by the Washington Accords and the TRIPP constitutes a strategic advantage for Türkiye and Azerbaijan. It helps remove existing political and diplomatic obstacles to the project’s implementation and circumvents longstanding opposition, particularly from Iran and Russia. For Armenia, the TRIPP represents a rare opportunity to stimulate economic development, consolidate its strategic reorientation toward the West, and rebalance its negotiating position vis-à-vis Baku, while simultaneously benefiting from the expanding trade and connectivity generated by the Middle Corridor.

By reconfiguring regional connectivity, the United States seeks to weaken both Iranian and Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Within this new strategic environment, any Iranian effort to obstruct the corridor in practice would no longer confront Azerbaijan or Türkiye alone, but rather the United States itself. Such opposition would also risk damaging Iran’s relationship with Yerevan and undermine its access to the North–South Corridor, thereby weakening Iran’s broader connectivity to Europe.

Although Iran and Russia share certain tactical positions, most notably their skepticism toward externally driven regional initiatives such as the TRIPP, their strategic interests diverge. Russia’s posture remains pragmatic and situational, shaped by its wider global priorities and flexibility in regional bargaining. Iranian officials, by contrast, increasingly perceive the TRIPP as a direct geopolitical threat, one that could marginalize Iran economically and strategically within emerging Eurasian trade networks.

Overall, the Washington Accords have the potential to reshape the geostrategic and geoeconomic landscape of the South Caucasus and to challenge Iran’s traditional regional foreign policy. However, the realization of these outcomes will depend on the successful implementation of an ambitious infrastructure agenda requiring sustained Western engagement, as well as the finalization of a durable peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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