Russia’s Nuclear Pressure on Europe: Beyond the Rhetoric
By Maxim Starchak
Key assessment: Russia is increasingly directing nuclear pressure at European governments while treating the United States (US) as its main interlocutor on strategic stability. The immediate challenge for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is to distinguish political threats from changes in Russian military capabilities, while preventing Moscow from driving a deeper wedge between European allies and Washington.
The policy problem
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin has repeatedly used nuclear threats to discourage direct US and NATO involvement in the war. Since Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, Moscow’s rhetoric has shifted to place greater emphasis on targeting European states – particularly those along its borderline. This change has coincided with uncertainty over Washington’s approach to Russia, NATO, and European security, as well as new European nuclear deterrence initiatives.
The problem is not simply more threatening language towards the West. Moscow increasingly presents European governments as separate participants in a nuclear confrontation, while reserving much of its strategic-stability dialogue for the US. If this distinction hardens, it could further weaken allied cohesion and complicate decisions on European deterrence.
Europe’s nuclear debate is changing
Two trends emerged in European nuclear policy in 2026. First, on 2 March, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled the doctrine of “forward deterrence”. This strategy offers European partners a greater role in French nuclear exercises and allows for the temporary deployment of elements of France’s strategic forces on allied territory. It is intended to complement, not replace, NATO’s nuclear deterrent. Several European governments have entered discussions with Paris over this initiative.[1] Second, new national programs towards the use of nuclear weapons have emerged.[2] Governments in Eastern and Northern Europe have declared their readiness to host foreign nuclear weapons on their territory and/or lift legal prohibitions on their deployment.
Russian officials have characterised these developments as escalatory and as an expansion of NATO’s combined nuclear potential (see RIA Novosti, Interfax). Yet Moscow has long argued that British and French arsenals should be considered in assessments of NATO’s nuclear forces. This position did not, in itself, prevent earlier bilateral arms-control talks between Moscow and Washington. The renewed focus on European nuclear forces therefore reflects a broader political shift, not merely a new assessment of their military significance.
Threats aimed at dividing the alliance
Throughout 2026, Moscow has issued increasingly direct warnings to individual European states, often including those who have supported the French deterrence doctrine and/or have considered deploying nuclear weapons on their territory (see, for example, Interfax, Kommersant, Voennoye Delo, Interfax, Russia Today). According to Janes, the number of threats against European states made by senior Russian political figures increased by 80% over the past year.
Some Russian officials and pro-Kremlin commentators have suggested that the US would not defend Europe in a confrontation with Russia (see, for example, remarks by Dmitry Medvedev and Sergei Karaganov). Others argue that Russia needs to deter Britain and France without threatening the US. These messages serve a political purpose: to cast doubt on US commitments and encourage European governments to view their security choices as carrying exceptional nuclear risks.
Moscow has also warned that countries considering foreign nuclear deployments or participation in French deterrence cooperation could become Russian nuclear targets (see, for example, Reuters, RBC, RBC, Vedomosti). Such statements are politically significant, but do not necessarily demonstrate a new targeting posture. Russian nuclear planning has long taken European targets into account. The distinction between an announced threat and a verifiable change in military readiness is therefore essential.
From signalling to potential military changes
Russian officials have threatened changes in military planning and weapons deployments to complement this shift in political rhetoric (see, for example, statements by the Russian Embassy in Denmark, Russian Embassy in Norway, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In August 2025, before the French initiative was announced, Russia abandoned its unilateral moratorium on deploying ground-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. This chronology matters: new European deterrence initiatives cannot, by themselves, explain Russia’s decision. I estimate that Russia may have up to 15 Oreshnik intermediate range missiles as of October 2026.
Further deployments of nuclear-capable missiles could increase pressure on Europe. In a high-end scenario, I estimate that Russia could eventually establish three intermediate-range missile divisions, potentially comprising up to 300 Oreshnik missiles. In particular, Russia could deploy such missiles in western regions such as Leningrad, Pskov and Kaliningrad, or strengthen its missile presence in Belarus instead of deploying them in one of the north-western regions. Producing this number of missiles could take approximately three years, provided that hostilities in Ukraine cease. In addition, some Russian experts propose equipping these missiles with nuclear warheads.
There are also calls in Russia to expand strategic nuclear capabilities and assign some new systems an explicit European role. To some extent, this is already happening. According to SIPRI, Russia has already exceeded the limit for deployed nuclear warheads that was set under the now-expired New START treaty. Russia may continue along this path in the near future as it increasingly positions European countries as potential nuclear targets.
Additional exercises involving Russia’s nuclear forces, including those targeting Europe, will become routine. During non-strategic nuclear force exercises in 2024 and 2026, Russia already directed these signals primarily at France and the United Kingdom. If Russian military actions in Ukraine end, the released military potential will be used to demonstrate military readiness for conflict with Europe, including through the use of nuclear weapons.
Policy options and recommendations
1. Preserve a single allied message. NATO members should coordinate their public responses to Russian nuclear warnings and reaffirm that European deterrence initiatives complement collective defence. Moscow should not be able to frame European security as separate from the transatlantic alliance.
2. Assess capabilities separately from rhetoric. Allies should distinguish public threats from confirmed changes in missile production, basing, warhead deployments and readiness. Scenarios based on uncertain production figures should be labelled as such, rather than treated as established Russian plans.
3. Prepare for a post-war change in Russian deployments. NATO should assess the possibility that Russia could redirect industrial and military resources towards missiles based in western Russia or Belarus if hostilities in Ukraine diminish. Early warning, air and missile defence, and contingency planning deserve particular attention.
4. Keep deterrence coordination and risk reduction together. European nuclear discussions, including France’s initiative, should remain closely coordinated with NATO and the US. Canada can support this through allied consultation, common threat assessments, and efforts to maintain channels for reducing the risk of miscalculation.
[1] As of writing, 10 European countries have officially agreed to participate in the dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the French initiative Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Norway, Poland, Sweden, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Three more – Bulgaria, Czechia, and Estonia – are considering joining or publicly discussing such a possibility.
[2] This includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuiania, Poland, and Sweden.