Strategic Stability in Flux: Can NATO Balance Deterrence, Defence, and Arms Control in a New Missile Age?

Introduction

The official expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in February 2026 represents a significant rupture in global strategic stability. For the first time since 1972, when SALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework. While the strategic environment has faced periodic shocks, such as the 2002 United States’ (US) withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (and the follow-on Russian decision not to ratify START II) and the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, regulatory continuity persisted until the recent expiration of the New START. As the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance faces a new ‘strategic trilemma’: the simultaneous and often contradictory imperatives of maintaining credible extended deterrence; enhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats; and reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stability – quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparency – have been discarded in favour of vertical nuclear proliferation. NATO must navigate an environment where the absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the security for all NATO Allies.  

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New START 

The international arms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessment of its lifespan suggests that the final pillar of this regime, the New START, was already flawed. A key qualitative weakness of New START was the absence of a ban on Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). This omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems, while remaining formally compliant to the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads. Well before the collapse of the INF Treaty in 2019, Moscow’s Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normative ‘shield’ to initiate a massive ‘re-MIRVing’ process. This modernization was driven by a powerful bureaucratic momentum within the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New START’s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as the Moscow’s Institute of Thermal Technologies (MITT), secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentum facilitated the emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield. 

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the ‘Upload’ Disparity 

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. Washington currently carries fewer warheads on its Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine Force (SSBN) than their maximum loading capacity to comply with New START and could rapidly surge its deployed strategic forces. If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treaty’s limits. As Washington initiates the deployment of its modernized strategic triad – spanning from the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class SSBNs, and the intercontinental bomber B-21 Raider – Russia is likely to view this comprehensive revitalization as a direct threat to its retaliatory capability. In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones. By fielding theatre long-range systems like the Oreshnik capable of bypassing Western defences, the Russian military would hold European targets in its crosshairs, utilizing sub-strategic coercion to neutralize Washington strategic upload capability.  

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap

The US’ planned deployment of the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), or Dark Eagle, in Germany would introduce a profound level of strategic compression. Unlike traditional ICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. This drastic reduction in decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and places extreme pressure on the adversary’s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated ‘launch on warning’ responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore, the deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a ‘launch-on-warning’ incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensive balance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.  

Managing Uncertainty in a Multipolar System 

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades. In the current environment, priorities must shift toward Confidence-Building and Risk Reduction Measures (CBMs and RRMs). In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russia’s current lack of trustworthiness and China’s strategic intentions.  

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. Moreover, Putin’s recent insistence on incorporating French and British nuclear capabilities into arms control negotiations appears to be a calculated attempt to drive wedges between Washington and its two European nuclear Allies. This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic: since SALT I, Moscow has consistently argued that the independent arsenals of European Allies should be factored into the overall NATO strategic balance. Putin’s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and ‘fears of abandonment’ between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, China’s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through China’s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal. This shift is primarily seen through the Chinese Rocket Force’s massive conventional long-range inventory. These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes. Most significantly, the recent fielding of conventionally armed variant of the DF-27 allows China to exert strategic pressure across the entire Asia-Pacific Region (APR) without crossing the nuclear threshold. This scenario of ‘conventional entanglement’ complicates the global force posture of NATO’s primary security provider, the US. Consequently, the NATO Alliance must factor in these trans-regional dynamics, as China’s ability to strike strategic nodes in the Indo-Pacific directly impacts upon Washington’s capacity to sustain its commitments and maintain the strategic balance in the Euro-Atlantic theatre.  

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic Nexus 

The ‘Strategic Trilemma’ is further complicated by the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into Early Warning and launch-control systems. As the speed of warfare accelerates through the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds. In the immediate future there will be formidable pressure on military bureaucracies to integrate AI to merge and interpret sensor data. However, the ‘black-box’ nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedented risks. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives – interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like the Dark Eagle or Oreshnik, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a ‘compressed escalation’ where a machine initiates a retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglement necessitates that any future arms control negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.  

The Shift towards Integrated Deterrence 

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Alliance’s defensive architecture. During the NATO-Ukraine Council meeting on January 12, 2026 – convened following Moscow’s employment of the Oreshnik – NATO Allies underscored the urgent requirement for layered Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD). This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched multinational initiatives to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new High Visibility Project for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the 2026 US National Defence Strategy reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the ‘two-peer’ challenge.  

Policy Recommendations:  

1. Rediscover a dual approach: Combine military modernization with a standing negotiating offer to both Russia and China on Strategic Stability Dialogue, which would likely benefit NATO Alliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATO member states.  

2. Prioritize Qualitative Limits: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.  In the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surge in capacity, afforded by US upload potential and Russia’s modernization of MIRV-capable systems. A ‘freeze’ approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than the reckless pursuit of superiority.  

3. Establish ‘Cold War Plus’ Communication Channels: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons. NATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters – specifically the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Russian Ministry of Defence – to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure they remain viable during high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.  

4. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control: Establish ‘human-in-the-loop’ standards between launch commands and early warning systems to prevent AI systems from triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters. While AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generation sensors like the HBTSS, it must never possess the autonomous authority to initiate a response. Hence, the NATO Alliance should champion an international protocol that mandates a ‘deliberation window’ for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations. 

5. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic: Clarify that systems like Dark Eagle are for Anti-Access/Ariel Denial (A2/AD) suppression, while acknowledging that their speed remains inherently destabilizing. NATO should explicitly disavow ‘decapitation’ or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to its C2 architecture. 

6. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a core component of strategic stability to prevent hybrid, non-kinetic bypassing of deterrence. By neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, the NATO Alliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholds and undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not be compromised by asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.  

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