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The Politics of Prisoner Exchange: Azovstal Defenders and the Limits of International Protection

By: Valeriia Gusieva

On May 25th, a major prisoner swap between Ukraine and Russia concluded, resulting in the return of 1,000 Ukrainians over a three-day exchange. This swap was part of ongoing “peace talks” held in Istanbul between Ukrainian and Russian representatives. The names of the released prisoners were not publicly disclosed, prompting many Ukrainian families to gather at reception points with photos of their missing loved ones, hoping someone might have seen them in Russian captivity. For many, it was a chance to learn whether relatives listed as missing in action were still alive. 

However, the exchange was bittersweet for some Ukrainian families. Notably, no members of the Azov Battalion were among the released, drawing strong criticism from Lieutenant Colonel Denys Prokopenko (callsign “Redis”), commander of the 12th Special Forces Brigade “Azov.” Russian authorities classify the Azov Battalion as a terrorist organization and frequently deny its members POW status, subjecting them to especially cruel and inhumane treatment. The issue of Ukrainian POWs has also been subject to manipulation in Russian media. For a detailed analysis, please refer to our previous foreign media scan: Propaganda and Prisoners: Russian Media Narratives on Ukrainian POWs – Foreign Media Scan. This media scan explores the political dynamics and public discourse surrounding the prisoner exchange process, particularly the exclusion of Azovstal defenders and the broader implications for international humanitarian protections. 

Background: Azovstal and the Humanitarian Evacuation 

From May 16 to 20, 2022, Ukrainian defenders were “evacuated” from the Azovstal steel plant with support from the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Ukrainian leaders deliberately used the term “evacuation” rather than “surrender.” However, there was no formal, legally binding guarantee from either the UN or ICRC assuring the fighters’ return within a specific timeframe.

soldier sitting
Photo: Personal Archive Dmytro Kozatskyi

After nearly two months of unrelenting bombardment, surrounded and outnumbered, the defenders were ordered to lay down arms. The battle for Azovstal is now seen as one of the most pivotal of the war, a last stand that bought time for Ukraine’s Armed Forces to regroup and for international support to arrive. An estimated 2,000–2,500 personnel were present in the plant during the final siege, including around 600–900 members of the Azov Regiment. 

soldiers sitting near fire
Photo: Personal Archive Dmytro Kozatskyi

On May 20, 2025, marking the third anniversary of the Mariupol siege, Prokopenko posted on X: 

Earlier, he had confirmed that 169 Azov fighters were released in 2024 through joint efforts of various agencies.  

After the latest 1,000-for-1,000 exchange, Prokopenko criticized the current prisoner exchange process: 

He also rejected the idea that Russia alone is responsible for blocking Azov’s return: 

Calling for bolder strategies, he suggested Ukraine rethink its leverage: 

Criticism from Other Veterans 
Prokopenko’s comments quickly spread on social media and were echoed by Azov supporters and activists. However, not all responses were supportive. Some felt his statements dismissed the sacrifices of other returned POWs. For example, Max Kolesnikov (callsign “Bald”), who spent ten months in Russian captivity, wrote

In comments under his X post, Kolesnikov argued that Prokopenko unjustly blamed the Coordination Headquarters for lacking the will to bring Azov fighters home and suggested that intense public attention may, paradoxically, make Russia more resistant.  

before and after photo
Max Kolesnikov before and after 10 months in Russian captivity — a stark visual testament to the physical and psychological toll endured by Ukrainian POWs. Photo credit: Roman Shrayk

Earlier in 2024, Kyrylo Budanov, Head of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence, stated that Russia exploits the Azov issue to sow internal division in Ukraine. He stressed that every prisoner exchange is a complex operation involving multiple agencies and layers of negotiation and he also reaffirmed Ukraine’s commitment to return every soldier home: 

Moscow Convention  

As part of its ongoing advocacy campaign, the Free Azov Movement continues to highlight the inhumane treatment of Ukrainian prisoners held in Russian captivity and to call for their prompt return. The movement also seeks to raise awareness of these abuses and demands accountability from international humanitarian organizations and leaders. A particularly noteworthy initiative, one that may reflect what Kolesnikov earlier described as an obstacle to focusing on the Azov Brigade due to increased public and international attention, is the Moscow Convention. This proposed alternative to the Geneva Conventions was developed by the Association of Families of Azovstal Defenders, in collaboration with the Banda Agency and select Ukrainian government bodies. This initiative reflects growing frustration with the perceived neutrality and limited effectiveness of international organizations like the ICRC. The proposed alternative to Geneva Convention Articles attempt to highlight that the ICRC has failed to ensure basic protections for POWs, including safeguards against torture and collective punishment, access to adequate medical care, food, clothing, hygiene, and exercise, the ability to correspond with families, and confidential visits by ICRC representatives tasked with monitoring detention conditions and reporting on the status of POWs.  

moscow convention
https://moscowconvention.com

“The Moscow Convention reflects the deep frustration of Ukrainian authorities — and I understand that frustration, as well as the motivations driving it,” said Jürg Eglin, head of the ICRC delegation in Ukraine, in an interview with The New Humanitarian. “However, I find it troubling that elements of international humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions, are being mocked. Neutrality is not a moral stance — it is a practical tool, a means of achieving outcomes that would otherwise be impossible.” 

Despite the international mandates to provide adequate treatment to POWs, the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reports that Ukrainian POWs are subjected to abuse and systematic torture at nearly every stage of their detention. In a recent interview, three Ukrainian prisoners of war, callsigns ‘Pako’, ‘Yuzhnyi,’ and ‘Rasti,’ all servicemen of the Azov Brigade, described the abuse they endured while in Russian captivity. They testified that when high-ranking prosecutors conducted visits and they attempted to file complaints about their treatment, they were frequently beaten afterward by lower-ranking officers in retaliation. For a detailed analysis of documented abuses and legal implications under international humanitarian law, please refer to our previous analysis: Abuses and Accountability – Unmasking Russia’s War Crimes Against Ukrainian Soldiers as Prisoners of War. 

Ongoing advocacy by families serves as a powerful reminder to both Ukrainians and the international community about the dire conditions faced by Ukrainian POWs, particularly members of the Azov Brigade, who are frequently subjected to harsher and more brutal treatment by Russian guards. However, this focus has recently sparked backlash in broader societal debates within Ukrainian social media sphere, with some arguing that it risks overshadowing the importance of securing the return of all Ukrainian prisoners. At the same time, discussions surrounding the Moscow Convention could spark a broader conversation about the future of international humanitarian law in the context of modern warfare. 

Further Reading and Viewing