PhD student Alex Rudolph recently published a policy perspective on Canada’s cyber defence. Alex’s research investigates the interaction between states, society, and cyberspace, with a focus on cyber conflict, cyber statecraft, the strategic thought of cyberspace, and Canadian cyber defense and cybersecurity. His doctoral research explores a structuration analysis and explanation of cyber conflict and warfare and how this informs the development of a country’s strategic doctrine of cyberspace and its use in military and intelligence operations.
Policy Perspective: Canada’s Active Cyber Defence is Anything But Active
Much has been said of the Canadian government’s 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE). However, the implementation of its active cyber policy in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) lacks analysis. SSE established that the federal government will develop the means to conduct active cyber operations as part of an assertive posture to operate strategically in cyberspace, including offensively with the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CAF. This commitment comes after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared that cyberspace is a warfighting domain in 2016 and NATO’s Cyber Defence Pledge, which reaffirmed the need for NATO members to enhance cyber defence as part of their collective defence commitment. Now, nearly four years after SSE, what is the state of Canada’s cyber defence and has the government met its obligations? Unfortunately, the CAF’s development of new active cyber capabilities has been anything but active.
