Photo of Myrto Mylopoulos

Myrto Mylopoulos

philosophy of mind; philosophy of action; philosophy of cognitive science

Degrees:B.A. (Toronto), M.A. (Simon Fraser), Ph.D (CUNY)
Phone:613-520-2600 x 3943
Office:3A47 Paterson Hall

Associate Professor

Office Hours

Mondays, 2:45-3:45 pm (in person); Tuesdays, 2:45-3:45 pm (in person); and by appointment (virtual).

Courses for 2022-23

  • PHIL 3502: Mind and Action
  • PHIL 4100: Special Topic in Philosophy
  • PHIL 5000: Special Topic in Philosophy

Research Interests

  • Consciousness
  • Metacognition
  • Agentive Phenomenology
  • Cognition-Action Interface
  • Motor Representations
  • Skill

Selected Publications

  • Agentive Phenomenology (coauthored with Joshua Shepherd). In Uriah Kriegel (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
  • “The Modularity of the Motor System” Philosophical Explorations, 24, 376-393, 2021.
  • “Unconscious Perception and Central Coordinating Agency” (with Joshua Shepherd), Philosophical Studies, 178, 3869-3893, 2021.
  • “Default Hypotheses in the Study of Perception: A Reply to Phillips” (with Jacob Berger), Journal of Consciousness Studies, 28(3-4), 206-219, 2021.
  • “Beyond Automaticity: The Psychological Complexity of Skill” (with Elisabeth Pacherie), Topoi, 1-14, 2020.
  • “On Skepticism About Unconscious Perception” (with Jacob Berger), Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(11-12), 8-32, 2019.
  • “Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited” (with Elisabeth Pacherie) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 10(2), e1481, 2019.
  • A Cognitive Account of Agentive Awareness, Mind and Language, 32, 545-563, 2017.
  • Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge (coauthored with Elisabeth Pacherie), Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8(2), 317-336, 2017.
  • Neural Antecedents of Spontaneous Voluntary Movement: A New  Perspective (coauthored with Aaron Schurger and David Rosenthal), Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(2), 77-79, 2016.
  • Agentive Awareness Is Not Sensory Awareness, Philosophical Studies, 172(3), 761-780, 2015.